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THE OATH: I*
HELEN SILVINOt
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Judge Jerome N. Frank.
Perhaps the most appropriate manner of honoring the memory of Judge
Frank is to attempt to repeat the message he tried to convey. The contribu-
tion most characteristically associated with his name is his "fact-skepticism,"
an expression of man's eternal doubt regarding his ability to perceive the
outside world, especially the world of past events. Judge Frank's jurispru-
dential message may best be described as "idealistic realism." To him "real-
ismi!" was not a utilitarian device but an ideal of justice. Legal precepts could
not be just unless they were based on an evaluation of the facts of social life
and on an assessment of the realities of legal procedure in the light of such
facts. A great theorist of facts, he was peculiarly qualified to realize the short-
comings of certain rules as they are applied to facts. From this understanding
sprang his genius for criticising those particular rules which pertain to the
procedure of fact finding-the rules of evidence. His criticism was princi-
pally directed at the ritualistic, symbolical character of some of these rules.a
*This Article is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to a presentation of
the historical evolution of the judicial oath in various legal systems. This presentation
is an attempt at showing that the oath has remained an atavistic survival of an ancient
ritual-a primitive self-curse. Legal systems in which an early oath tradition is either
entirely lacking or is rather tenuous have little or no desire to engage in oath practices.
This will be demonstrated by a brief outline of the history of certain legal systems which
presently have no oath. Since the concept of "perjury" is predicated upon the notion of
the oath, a final isection will deal with the history of perjury.
The second part of this Article will appear in the July issue of the Yale Law Joura.
It will deal with contemporary oath legislation and present suggestions for reform.
In both parts of this Article, the translations were made by author, unless otherwise
indicated by the context. Original sources were used whenever possible; however, Eng-
lish translations exist for many of the works cited.
fProfessor of Law, University of Puerto Rico; Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School.
Completion of this article, as part of a comprehensive study of the Philosophy of
Criminal Justice, was facilitated by a grant of the Rockefeller Foundation. The author
is deeply indebted to Judith S. Kestenberg, M.D., New York City, for constructive
criticism of the manuscript. In no way, however, should Doctor Kestenberg be deemed
responsible for the views expressed herein.
a. See Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 997 (2d Cir. 1.942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109
(1943).
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INTRODUCTION: THE OATH'S BEGINNINGS
THE familiar oath of the present-day courtroom has been traced to a pre-
religious, indeed, pre-animistic period of culture.' Supernatural beings were
unknown,2 and man believed that he possessed magic power which could pro-
duce any desired result. A vehicle of this power was the curse, which could
kill as effectively as physical force. It worked through the magic inherent
in the word 3 or the magic act.4 The harm invoked was arbitrarily chosen by
the speaker or actor, but his choice worked with the force of fate, which, in
later stages of culture, was deemed superior to the gods. The uttered curse
became an entity independent of its speaker's will. Curses were not symbols
of magic, but rather operative magic performances.6 Thus, by use of a par-
ticular curse, man could determine both disaster and victim. Indeed, that vic-
tim could be himself. The oath was a self-curse, uttered in conditional form,
operating irrevocably upon occurrence of the condition. Thus the self-
curse could be utilized as a means of guaranteeing that a promise would be
performed.7
The oath as self-curse continued to operate automatically, by virtue of the
inherent magic of word or gesture, after the onset of the animistic period and
even after the "discovery" of divine beings. The Assyrians, for example,
believed in the autonomous operation of the oath long after the deity was first
invoked in the oath formula.8 Their mumit (or munitu, a term more compre-
hensive than "oath") could be "placed" into any thing-trees, fire, and par-
ents, as well as gods, though the latter may have been deemed somewhat
stronger media of the oath's magic.9 The automatic sanction was either that
1. 'See LAScH, DER ErD 3-4 (1903) [hereinafter cited as LASce].
2. Later "gods" were thought of as men endowed with special magical powers.
3. The magic of language--of the word uttered-is an extremely significant element
in the rise of the oath. See Preuss, Der Urspring der Religion und Kunst, 86 GLoBus
321, 355, 375, 388 (1904) ; 87 id. at 394, 395, 413 (1905).
4. See PEDERSEN, DER EID BEI DEN SEIITEN IN SEINEM VERHXLTNIS ZU VERWAND-
TEN ERSCHEINUNGEN SOWIE DIE STELLUNG DES Emzs IM ISLAIM 95-96 (1914) [herein-
after cited as PEDERSEN].
5. See PEDERSEN 89, 157. The curse may have been the predecessor' of "evil spirits,"
which in turn furnished the patterns for later divine beings.
6. Lasch, however, believes that oath gestures were originally instinctive acts of self-
defense. LASCN 10.
7. It was believed that the curse, even in conditional form, could produce the dis-
aster to which verbal expression was given. Therefore, the curse was often expressed in
terms of a blessing. Instances of this custom may be found in the Bible. See 1 Kings
21-:9. In medieval Europe the oath formula occasionally began with the invocation of
God's blessing. See BoRowsxi, PZYSIEGA DOWODOWA W PROCESIE POLSKIM P6 NIEjSZEGO
REIDNIOWIECZA 37 (1926). But oath formul often expressly state the curse. This was
common practice for Jews, adherents of Greek Orthodoxy, and, earlier, for pagan Slavs.
But among the Roman Catholics, it was exceptional. See id. at 39.
8. PEDERSEN 155.
9. There is an instance in the Bible in which a conditional curse, combined with an
oath, was "placed" into water. See Numbers 5:19-31.
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specified in the oath itself or a particular sanction attaching to perjury gener-
ally-for instance, in Greece and Rome, Zeus (Jupiter) was believed to
strike perjurers with lightning.Y0
As divine beings gained significance, the curse ceased to exist as an inde-
pendent being and gods became the tools whereby the oath was caused to
operate. However, although the gods served as media, the oath continued to
work magically. The Greeks, for instance, believed that the oath could in-
fluence gods as well as men." Eventually, the God of monotheistic religions
acted as executor of man's oath. He was thought to respond to its magic, and
it was believed to affect his actions with determinative power.' 2 The curse of
the oath was now infused in a monotheistic deity.
But the curse of the oath could be placed in the object to be affected as
well as in the instrument of execution. The object was usually a thing of
particular value staked as a pledge of performance. The sanction of the oath-
to strike at that object-was normally symbolized by an oath gesture, such as
touching the object. Since our present oath is undoubtedly rooted in the Bible
it is significant to note the choice of the object by which the oath was there
taken. In Genesis 24:2-9, and Genesis 47:29, it was taken on male genitalia.'3
Some authors trace this practice to an early adoration of the Phallus,14 while
10. See, e.g., ARISTOPHANES, THE CLOUDS verse 397, at 40-41 (Rudolph transl. 1941);
OVID, A.moRos III, iii, 30-35, at 459 (Loeb ed. 1931).
11. See LAsCe 5.
12. This is not surprising, since the Bible even shows remnants of an old belief that
God can be the victim of a curse. The Old Testament penalty for cursing the Lord was
death by stoning. See Leviticus 24:11-16.
Bentham pointed to the "absurdity, than which nothing can be greater," of the sup-
position that "by man, over the Almighty, power should . . . be exercised or exercis-
able . . . ; man the legislator and judge, God the sheriff and executioner ;-man the
despot, God his slave." BENTHAM, "SWEAR NOT AT ALL"-CONTAINING AN EXPOSURE OF
THE NEEDLESSNESS AND MISCHIEVOUSNESS, AS WELL As ANTICHEISTIANITY OF THE CERE-
M5ONY OF AN OATH 3-4 (1817).
13. PEDERSEN 150, reports that Arabs today still administer oaths by placing the
left hand upon the head of the oath taker and the right hand under his belt, grasping his
genitals, saying: "I adjure thee by thy belt and thy genitals, by (thy children) which
thou already possesseth and those which thou will yet possess, by thy relatives and thy
descendants." Women swear by their breasts.
14. See GUNKEL, GENESIS 250-51 (3d rev. ed. 1910).
It is noteworthy that under Talmudic law spilling of semen is comparable to murder.
1 THE PENTATEUCH AND RAsHr's COmmaENTARY Genesis 38:7-10, at 383 (Ben Isaiah &
Sharfman ed. & transl. 1949). But abortion was hardly punishable. See Tractate San-
hedrin 59a, Tosaphot. The author is indebted to Mr. C. Daniel Chill, a second-year stu-
dent at the Yale Law School, for this information. See also Jakobovits, Artificial In-
senzination, Birth-Control and Abortion, 2 HARoFA HAIVRI 169, 170 (1.953).
The present European custom of raising two fingers in oath taking may well be evi-
dence of the survival of the ancient Biblical oath on virility. By tracing medieval Swiss
customs, Kfinssberg has pointed to the probability that the pattern of the "two-finger
oath" is the "three-finger oath" to be found in Swiss law books, Kiinssberg, Schwur-
fingerdeutung und Schwurgebdrde, 61 ZEITSCHRIFT FiR SCHWEIzEUSCREs RECHT 384
(1929). Of course, Kiinssberg relates this, as appears in the sources, to the Holy Trinity.
1959] 1331
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
others regard it as an expression of adherence to the clan, represented by the
generative power of man.15 Significantly, the oath in these instances is taken
by the genitals of the father and not by those of the oath taker. In another
early Biblical passage, Jacob takes an oath by "the fear of his father Isaac,"
and immediately thereafter eats with his brothers. 6 Assuming that-as has
been suggested by one authority 17 -- these oaths are related to each other,
they appear to reflect the peculiar phenemenon of a simultaneous fear of the
father and concern for the father.' s Perhaps they may be consistently ex-
plained in the light of the Freudian view of early struggles and solutions
within the family group.19 In any event, these pre-law Biblical oaths express
the preoccupation of that era's man with problems of procreation, virility and
family conflicts, and are hardly expressions of an advanced spiritual relation-
ship of man to God.
All advanced monotheistic religions have been disturbed by these peculiarly
primitive features of the oath. They have, therefore, attempted new rationali-
zations, without abandoning ancient forms. As a result, remnants of ancient
practices are combined with the prevailing interpretation of the oath as an
affirmation of faith. For example, both the Bible and the Koran permit the
taking of an oath only in the form of an invocation of the only God, for the oath
is an expression of belief in the Almighty and His power.2 0 Yet, the incon-
gruity between God's omnipotence and His yielding to the impact of a human
oath pervades Biblical as well as all later history.
Religious efforts in reforming the oath have been directed towards suppres-
sing its function as a form of promise or sanction and elevating its incidental
quality-the confession of faith. In such cases it is transformed into a pure
oath of allegiance to God. In the Old Testament, worship of God and swearing
Freud, however, has singled out "three" as a special symbol of male genitals. FRuD,
VORLESUNGEN ZUR EINFOHRUNG IN DIE PSYCHOANALYSE 166 (5th ed. 1926). It may be
important to note in this context that, according to Setser, SnrsER, TRAcrATUS DE JURA-
IiENTIS lib. I, cap. XV, at 84 (11672), cited in Kfinssberg, supra at 404 n.60, only men
raised their fingers in swearing, while "women place the same fingers on. the left breast,
but do not raise the hand, so that the sbjectio be evident 'qua viris sunt adstrictae"'
(that they are limited to men).
15. See PEDERSEN 150, who points out that in Genesis 24:2-9, the oath is administered
by the pater familias to a slave.
16. Genesis 31:53, 54. One might be inclined to interpret this oath as referring to
the one whom Isaac feared: the Lord. But the term used in this instance to denote "fear"
is not that normally used to express the fear of God---"Yrdh" (reverence, awe)-but
is rather a term indicating anxiety, spontaneous fear-"pahad." The phrase, "pahad
Yzhak" (fear of Isaac) in Hebrew, as in English, indicates both Jacob's fear of Isaac
and Isaac's fear.
17. PEDERSEN 151.
18. On such phenomenon see, e.g., FREUD, Analyse der Phobie eines fiinfjiihrigen
Kizaben, in 7 GESAMMELTE WERKE 243 (1941).
19. See FREUD, Totem lund Tabu, in 9 GESAimELTE WERKE 154-86 (1940).
20. See Deuter. 6:14; 10:21; Isaiah 48:1; Psalms 63:11.
As to the Koran, see PEDERSEN 160.
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by His Name are often identified,21 and Islamic doctrine includes the idea
that it is better to take a hundred oaths by Allah and breach them than to
swear with fidelity by another.
22
In all monotheistic religions criticism and censure of the oath exists along-
side of oaths taken by God as well as by the religion's leading figures. The
Old Testament prohibits idle, unnecessary oath taking,23 while the Lord Him-
self swears by His own Name.24 Islam shows an outright rejection of the
binding force of oaths ;25 yet both Allah and Mohammed frequently took them.
A direct prohibition of vows may be inferred from the doctrine that Allah will
not permit Himself to be thus influenced. 26 And Christ rejected the oath on
analogous grounds.
27
Linguistic usage demonstrates that, notwithstanding efforts to suppress its
objectionable origins, the oath, throughout the formative era of monotheistic
religions, remained essentially a self-curse, rooted in magic. The Arabic term
for oath, "kasam" (El Kasant), is used in Hebrew for "magic." 28 The Hebrew
term "alah" is used in the Old Testament to denote either an oath or a curse,
2 9
much as the Assyrian lnumitu.30
Strengthening of the concept of divine omnipotence and use of the oath in
"legal" issues led to its transformation into an ordeal form.2 ' However, in
other ordeals, the decision was thought to be made by the divinity and issued
in the form of a sign, such as the healing of a wound inflicted with a hot
iron. By contrast, in the oath ordeal, the oath itself determined the issue-
its mere utterance resolved the issue in the oath taker's favor. It was the
"divine judgment" and not merely a means of bringing about such judgment.
21. See Deuter. 6:31; 10:20.
22. See Nawawi IV, at 99, cited in PEDERSEN 208.
23. See Exodus 20:7; Deuter. 5:11.
24. See Jeremiah 44:26. And Christ permitted Himself to be sworn. Matthew 26:
63-64.
25. 4 EL-BOKHARI, LES TRADITIONS ISI.AmiQUES 328-29 (Houdas transl. 1914).
26. Id. at 348-49.
27. Matthew 5:34, 36.
In Christianity, the conflict between swearing by God and total rejection of the oath
later resulted in the intermediary solution of swearing by saints. On this and the Greek
custom of swearing by god-substitutes see HIRZEL, DER EID, EIN BEITRAG Zu SEINER
GESCHICHTE 110 n.2 (1902).
28. See PEDERSEN 180.
29. As "oath," see Ezekiel 17:13, 16, 18, 19; as "curse," see Genesis 26:28. Numbers
5:21, 27 uses the term interchangeably.
30. See PEDERSEN 108. Compare text at notes 8-9 supra.
Similarly, in medieval Slavic laws, there existed interchangeable use of "oath" and
"curse." See BoRowsxI, op. cit. supra note 7, at 10.
31. "Ordeal" will be used in this Article as "judgment of God." It is quite possible
that so-called "ordeals," such as the ordeal of fire or water, were originally considered
magic, not divine, judgments. Thayer drew attention to the fact that in pre-Christian rites
the thing used as means whereby the ordeal was believed to operate is referred to in the
adjuring formula preceding the test as a "witness." 1 THAYER, EVIDENCE AT THE COM-
moN LAw 35-36 n.1 (1896) [hereinafter cited as THAYER].
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Obviously, in the oath ordeal man himself was, in a sense, the decision maker,
while God intervened merely as sanctioning agent. This identification is remin-
iscent of man's pre-animistic status as magic's moving force. The perjury
sanction was not an essential element, for a false oath, although punishable,
was as decisive of disputes as a true oath. The judgment-like character of the
oath was also reflected in automatic retribution. Until quite late in history the
oath required no external legal sanction, for God was believed to be the exclu-
sive penalizer of perjury.
32
Since the taker's anticipation of the results of a breach acts as an automatic
deterrent to the breaking of an oath, the question may well be asked as to
why the keeping of oaths is considered a virtue. Why do Arabs, for instance,
take a particular pride in abiding by their promises made under oath ?33 The
answer to this problem involves the varying concepts of morality and man's
relation to the idea of "truth." One authority suggests that the modern dif-
ferentiation between morality and fear of purely external disadvantage, harm,
damage or dishonor, was unknown to the ancient Semites. To them, success
was virtue and failure was vice. "Truth" was not-as it is in the ideal of
modern man-accordance with objective facts, but was successful assertion
of one's cause. For the Germanic tribes as well, the notion of "truth" coal-
esced with effectively prevailing over another man or another group. 4 To
keep one's oath was an expression of "power." This explains the fact that,
among the Germanic tribes and in early English procedure, as well as among
the ancient Semites, men swore to matters of which they had no knowledge.
Those oaths were not means of establishing a fact but expressions of solidar-
ity with the group which the oath taker-a member of that group--wished
to prevail.8 5 This amorphous concept of truth,36 constitutes the link between
the promissory and the assertive or judicial oath. The assertive oath also ul-
timately carries a promise: that it will prevail.
32. Thus, biblical legislation differentiates the "vain oath" from false testimony-the
false accusation of another. Only the latter is governed by the lex talionis, punishment be-
ing measured by the fate the offender tried to inflict upon his neighbor. See Deuter.
19:19. When perjury became punishable by law, the type of punishment still often re-
flected what would have been the automatic response to the self-curse of the oath. Thus,
e.g., CoNs-iTuno CRIMNALIS CAROLINA art. 107 (1532) provided that the perjurer's
"two fingers with which he swore" be cut off. Of course, this type of punishment also
reflects the general idea of the magical retributory function of early punishment.
33. See PEDERsEN 28-32.
34. A form of prevailing is receiving a reward. There is evidence of an expectation
of reward for keeping oaths, corollary to that of punishment for breaching them. On this
see KNOKE, DAS ZUC IrITT DER DROHUNG nm EiDE 47-48 (1896).
35. "Truth" thus conceived remains vaguely reflected in Biblical language. "Emeth"
(truth), "emiuna" (loyalty), and "amen?' (so be it) are related concepts. The unity of
truth and power is expressed in the root "tzadok" (sidk), which in Hebrew and in Arabic
means "to be right," "to speak the truth," "to be as one ought to be," and "to prevail." For
citations see PEDERSEN 131.
36. It is interesting to note that the test of a "true" prophet in the Bible is the occur-
rence of an event predicted by him, a successful sign. Deuter. 18:16-22.
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The notion of "prevailing" as truth may be responsible for the oath's ap-
pearance in a form more closely resembling other ordeals. Sometimes it was
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the disaster conditionally invoked in the
oath's curse that afforded the test of guilt or innocence. Among the Indian
Bhils, a man issues a written statement in which he admits guilt in the event
that a serious accident should strike him or his family within a specified
period of time.37 In Greece and Rome, persons who died by lightning were
denied a regular burial, for such death was regarded as Zeus' normal punish-
ment of perjurers.38 Later, however, fear of the occurrence of the event in-
voked by the oath replaced the event itself as a sanctioning agent. Thus, the
oath became proof. But the probative character of the oath has remained
predicated upon belief that the oath is operative-that the event invoked will
occur if the oath was false.39 Thus, the oath was the factor that decided the
issue, and it rendered a judicial decision unnecessary. Once it came to operate
as proof, it was absolute proof, binding upon the judge. A sworn statement
was not subject to a court's evaluation, even if the law otherwise recognized
the principle of free judicial inquiry. This type of oath, adopted and developed
in the Roman law, is preserved in the canon law and may be found in mod-
ern, and even contemporary, civil law.. Later, with a basic transformation
of the concepts of truth and judicial truth-finding, the oath finally developed
into evidence, the weight of which the judge was allowed to evaluate with
at least some measure of freedom.
The original judicial oath was not incidental to testimonial evidence.
Rather the reverse was the case; witnesses supported the oath.40 Indeed,
testimony did not originally constitute an independent means of proof. It
was but a means of fortifying the litigants' oath. At best the witnesses
swore with the party as compurgators, and did not individually testify to the
truth of facts within their knowledge. Their support, however, formed an
37. LASCH 22. Primitive man believes himself guilty when he is convicted in accord-
ance with custom. See MELLAND, IN WITcH-BouND A1RICA 130 (1923).
38. KNo E, op. cit. supra note 34, at 38.
39. BENTHAXm, op. cit. supra note 12, at 4, asserted that the oath must thus auto-
matically operate without exception, lest it be ineffective.
In ancient laws the pure ordeal and the oath are occasionally combined. In the case of
a woman suspected of adultery, the Old Testament, Numbers 5, provides for a test by or-
deal, operating by the medium of a priest's utterance of a curse put into water and of an
oath of the woman, whereas in the Code of Hammurabi §§ 131-32, the woman can purge
herself by oath, although the husband may demand an ordeal; and in the Koran, Surah 24,
6-9i the husband testifies fourfold under oath to the truth of his allegation and, fifth, in-
vokes Allah's curse should he lie, whereupon the wife may defend by fourfold testimony
and the oath. GIAvEN, L'Obligation de parler enr justice, in DROIT ET VAITA 106, 107
(1946), cites a medieval instance in which a man suspected of an assault at night could
purge himself by oath accompanied by placing a finger on red hot iron, which is a form
of combining the oath and the ordeal.
40. The first oath was an oath of purgation or innocence taken by the accused rather
than the independent oath of a witness. LAscH 21.
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integral part of the oath ordeal. Since the decisive oath was an expression
of power and varied in strength depending on the magic 41-and later, so-
cial-power of the utterer, family or clan support was significant in adding
strength to the oath of the party. Although the decisive oath was eventu-
ally replaced by witnesses, their numerical strength remained conclusive,
reminiscent of the decisiveness of the number of compurgators. Testimony
of sufficient numerical strength became proof which bound the judge. The
testimony thus functioned as an ordeal, as the oath had done before.
As testimony emerged as an independent form of proof, it was not predi-
cated upon an oath. Neither the Bible nor the Koran 42 reports that witnesses
were sworn.43 In fact, at times, testimonial evidence was treated as equivalent
to the defendant's oath. Thus, Mohammed said: "Thy two witnesses or his
oath." 44 Variations in oath formulae also record the transition from proof by
oath to testimonial proof. Some Old Testament 45 and Arabic 40 oaths invoked
God as a "witness." In these oaths, it would seem, God still functioned as a
"compurgator," adding strength to the utterer's case rather than testifying as
a witness. In the course of its separation from the oath, testimonial proof also
underwent a gradual transformation of meaning and function as it was adapted
to a changing concept of truth and judicial truth-finding. As early as Biblical
times, witnesses testified to facts within their knowledge, although the ordeal
character of testimonial proof was preserved by the continued significance of
numerical strength. Nonetheless, the witness even then occupied an inter-
mediate position between a medium of proof and a judge or executioner
47
Biblical proof was achieved by testimony and not by oath, but later periods
of history adapted the Bible's promissory oath to courtroom needs, mistakenly
assuming it to be applicable to testimonial evidence. The assertory or testimonial
oath (as distinguished from the promissory and the party oath) developed
gradually. The Roman law and later the canon law served as media for its
acceptance in the West. Although the testimonial oath was firmly established
in Rome in the erroneous belief that it was a Christian tradition,48 it is not
exclusively derived from this Roman misconception. Today, the oath is a general
41. That this conception of the curse still prevailed in the Old Testament may be seen
from the fact that the Lord chose to influence Balaam-apparently a professional curser-
rather than to nullify his curse. Numbers 22, 24.
42. But see Surak 5, 106 (witnesses to will of person who dies in a foreign country
must be sworn).
43. But in some Semitic cultures there existed the custom of pronouncing a maledic-
tion to procure testimony. See Boaz Cohen, Testimonial Compulsion in Jewish, Roman,
and Moslem Law, 9 IVRA-4RRIVIsTA INTMRNAZIONALE DI DIRiTro ROMANO E ANTico 1, 18
n.72 (1958).
44. See 2 EL-BoxHAm, LEs TRAD IIONS IsLAlSIQuEs 224 (Houdas & Marcais transl.
1906).
45. See 1 Samuel 20:23, 42; Jeremiah 42:5.
46. "Allahu baini wabainaka," Tab. II, 119, 12, cited in PDERSEN 161.
47. The witness functioned as the first executioner. Deuter. 17:7.
48. See note 56 infra.
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phenomenon, appearing in various cultures.49 In all its various forms, whether
promissory or assertory, conclusive or evidentiary, testimonial or party-oath,
the oath remains essentially a self-curse, even when disguised as a blessing or
an invocation of God's testimony. The curse "is part of the oath, as the threat
of punishment is part of the law."50
THE OATH IN CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS
Ron= Law
While pre-Christian Greek and Roman law occasionally employed oaths, 51
the more enlightened philosophers expressed grave doubts about their evi-
dentiary efficacy and moral value. Aristotle characterized the oath as "an un-
proved statement supported by an appeal to the gods. '52 Greek censure of
the oath, later adopted by Roman exponents of Greek thought,5 3 was not
based on a belief in man's incapacity to make the oath triumph over God's
will (the Biblical and Koranic view), but on moral, humanistic considera-
tions.5 4 From the fifth century B.C. on, human dignity became more and
more highly regarded. Absolute veracity was the mark of a proud, self-con-
fident and free man, lying the mark of a slave. 5 The belief developed that
the gods punish all lies, not only formal perjury. The oath, therefore, added
nothing to the fear of retribution, and declined in importance. Consequent-
ly, later Roman restoration of the Graeco-Roman oath tended to supplement
divine retribution with incidental secular punishment.
Testimonial oaths were finally institutionalized in Roman jurisprudence in
the fourth century A.D., when Constantine, erroneously believing that he
was following Christian practice, required witnesses' statements to be sworn.5 6
This provision was incorporated into the Code of Justinian, 57 and from that
source it was adopted by all of European Christendom. The Roman law also
afforded the pattern for the distinctive institution of the civil "party oath."
49. Borowski's opinion that it is a universal phenomenon, BOROWSKI, Op. Cit. supra
note 7, at 1, appears erroneous. China, for example, has no oath tradition. See notes 325-
27 infra and accompanying text.
50. HiRZEL, op. cit. supra note 27, at 139.
51. See 2 SCHOEMANN, GRIECHISCHE ALTERTHOMER 254, 282 (4th ed. Lipsius 1902);
Tnurnc um, GEsCHICHTE DES EIDEs 5-6 (i911) [hereihafter cited as THuDICHUM].
52. ARISTOTLE, RHEToiuc 17 (Rackham transl. 1937). The Stoics advised shunning the
oath whenever possible. See THumIcatnm 4.
53. See Cicno, DE OFFcics bk. III, fr. 29 (Loeb ed. 1928). See also CICERO, PRO
QUiNTO Roscio COMODEO fr. 16, com. 46 (Freese ed. 1.930).
54. See HIRZE-, op. cit. supra note 27, at 112-15.
55. See particularly the words of Callicles in PLATO, GORGIAS 482 C (Lamb transi.
1932) ; cf. PLUTARcH, QUAESTIoNEs ROMANAE 44 (for English translation see THE ROMAN
QUESTIONS OF PLUTARCHE 139 (Rose transl. 1924)).
56. Constitution of Naissus, 334 A.D. Until this constitution at Naissus, the sources
do not mention any oath of witnesses. KUTrNER, DiE jIUmSmCHE NATUR DER FALSCHEN
BEWEISAUSSAGE 11 n.24 (1931) [hereinafter cited as KuTx=ER].
57. CODE 4.20.9.
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The nature of the Roman oath philosophy may be inferred from the oath's
Latin name: sacramentum.58 This term had, in the era of the legis actiones
(753 B.C.-ca. 150 B.C.), denoted a wager, or a pledge which a losing litigant
forfeited to the priests. Thus, the term suggests the loss which any oath taker
suffers in the event that the condition of the oath occurs. Indeed, the self-
curse was expressly stated in Justinian's 'oath for officials, who undertook, in
case of breach of duty, "to receive and keep [his] share here and in the
world to come in the terrible judgment of the Lord God and our Saviour
Jesus Christ, together with Judah and the leprosy of Gesy and the trembling
of Cain."' 9
The Roman civil "party oath" should be distinguished from the testimon-
ial oath, the probative value of which is subject to judicial evaluation. The
"party oath" functioned as an ordeal; it decided the issue. This decisive oath
appeared in two forms. The "decisory oath" was tendered by one party to
the other with the understanding that if accepted it would resolve the issue.
The "suppletory oath" was tendered by the judge to one party-never to
both on a single issue-after some evidence had been given in his favor, and
was understood to supply the missing portion of the proof.60 The civil party's
decisive oath subsequently was adopted by the canon law, and thereby pene-
trated the civil procedure of civil-law countries. Even today, the decisive civil-
party oath has survived in some legal systems, particularly the French and
the Italian.
Through the classical period, proceedings in iure, the stage prior to joinder
of issues, were strictly separated from those in iudicio, the trial stage. Cor-
relatively, the oath in iure was sharply distinguished from the oath in judicio.
Originally the "decisory oath" in igre was not the basis of judicial decision
but rather a substitute for it. Either the oath or the decision resolved the case
("Ait praetor: 'eum a quo iusiurandum petetur, solvere aut iurare cogam."). 1
If the oath were taken by the offeree, judicial intervention was rendered un-
necessary. But the party to whom the oath was tendered could refer it back to
the offeror. If he neither took it nor referred it back nor satisfied the claim
against him, he was subject to disadvantages, the nature of which are a matter
of controversy. 62 The prevailing view is that he was treated as a confessuts
58. JOLoWIcZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 184 (1952).
There were two other terms denoting "oath": hiusirandirn and iuramentum. It was also
described briefly as "religio."
59. The oath continued thus: "and I want, in addition, to be subject to the penalties
provided for in the laws of your Mercy." Nov. 8, Coll. I-I, tit. 3, in 3 CoRPus JuRIs CivIus
91 (Schoell & Kroll ed. 1954).
60. As will be seen in the second part of this Article, the suppletory oath still binds
the judge in Italy.
61. This praetorian edict is reported in DIGEST 12.2.34.6 (Ulfianis lib. XXVI ad
edictum). See the classic work of DEmELIus, SCHIEDSEI UND BEWEISEID 37 (1887). See
generally BIONDI, IL GIURAMENTO DECISORIO NEL PROCESSO CIVILE ROMANO (1913) [here-
inafter cited as BIONDI].
62. Id. at 7, 8.
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(one who confessed judgment) or iudicatus (one against whom judgment
was rendered) or an indefensus (one who does not defend)." Roman jur-
ists held this oath in ure to be "pro iudicio" (equivalent to a judgment). 64
It has been said that this was a private transaction between the parties rather
than a procedural step " and that it served as a means of avoiding litigation
rather than as a means of proof.0 6 Since the parties could agree to any solu-
tion, resolution by an oath in iure might be equated with modern pretrial
settlements, and thus thought to have no particular legal significance. But
private or not, the oath was a solution by ordeal.
In any event, by Justinian's time this in iure oath undoubtedly had become
part of the process of litigation. It had ceased to be a substitute for decision
and had become an act which necessarily resulted in a decision in favor of the
oath taker. 7 It functioned as absolute proof; it bound the judge to render
decision accordingly.
Oaths in hudicio were both "decisory" and "suppletory." 8 Again, the deci-
sory oath, being equivalent to disposition of the case by party transaction,
might be regarded as a wholly private agreement. However, even in classical
times, the decisory oath in iudicio necessitated the rendering of a judgment,
albeit a predetermined one. In Justinian's law the oath forfeited much
of its private character, since it could no longer be tendered by a party with-
out judicial approval.6 9 And the suppletory oath, offered by the judge, repre-
sented a departure from the classical Roman principle that the parties and
not the judge were to adduce the proof. This inconsistency then prevailing
in Roman procedure has led modern scholars to doubt that this iusiurandum
hudiciale was part of classical Roman law or is of Roman origin at all. Some
believe that it was the product of Christian mysticism, beginning to function
as proof of objective truth, and marking a transition from free judicial evalu-
ation to the decisive oath of Justinian's time.70 In Rome itself the question of
whether a judge who tendered an oath must then abide by it was a trouble-
some one.7 ' Binding him to decide the case pursuant to the oath is of course
inconsistent with the recognized principle of free judicial evaluation of the
evidence. 72 This inconsistency was reflected in the canon law, medieval law
63. See DEMELIUs, op. cit. supra note 61, at 134, 148. For citation of divergent opinions
see BIONDI 31.
64. DIGEST 12.2.35.L See also DIGEST 12.2.34.9; BIONDI 31-32.
65. DEIFhIUus, op. cit. supra note 61, at 81, calls it "eidliches rechiskraftigea Partei-
urlheil" (sworn final party-judgment). See also BIONDI 53.
66. See id. at 6, 52.
67. Id. at 65.
68. See id. at 77.
69. See id. at 98.
70. See id. at 79-80, 86-87, 88, 90.
71. See DIGEST 12.3.4.3 (Ultfiamts lib. XXXVI ad edicturn); ,BIONDI 107.
72. Hadrian's Rescript instructed the judge to decide "ex sententia animi tid" (by
the judgment of your [intuitive] mind). DIGEST 22.5.3.2. Compare this with DIGEST
12.2.5.2.
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and in modern civil law. As will be shown, the conflict between use of the oath
and free judicial evaluation, already noticed in Roman law, became the ob-
ject of severe criticism during the era of the French Revolution and brought
on the oath's abandonment in several legal systems.
Germanic Law
The second source of the oath as a legal institution, the source of the "oath
of purgation" which left an enduring imprint on criminal proceedings, was the
law of the Germanic tribes. Throughout that law's history, the oath dominated
all stages of litigation.
During the so-called "Germanic period," the era running through the end
of the migration of barbarian tribes, all legal procedure was dominated by
the parties; the court played a subordinate role.73 By the use of ceremonial
words and invocation of the gods, the plaintiff stated his claim and adjured his
opponent to answer. Upon the plaintiff's formal request, the Rachinburghi-
a committee of the general judicial assembly-rendered a so-called "double-
tongued" judgment.74 This judgment both delineated the oath that the de-
fendant must swear in order to prevail and, at the same time, disposed of the
issue in the alternative.75 For instance, a judgment might state that the defen-
dant must either swear an oath of innocence or pay compensation to the plain-
tiff. By his oath the issue was resolved in the defendant's favor. Whether the
defendant chose to swear or refused the oath, the litigation was at an end.
Generally, the defendant had the burden--or rather, the benefit--of proof;
he could discharge it by taking the oath either alone or with a number of
compurgators. These Eideshelfer (oath helpers) were members of his clan
and swore that his oath was "pure and not perjurious" (rein und unnwin).
Operationally, the oath was an act of tribal solidarity. The compurgators did
not swear individually but as a body ("wit gesamtem Munde"--"by total
[corporate] mouth"). Only two types of witnesses were known: witnesses
who supplied the formality of a legal transaction, and witnesses who reported
the community's common knowledge. Accidental perception of an event did
not qualify a person as a witness. Moreover, only one side was heard and
admission of testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses automatically excluded the
defendant's oath. Nor could an oath be opposed by counter-oath, for the man-
ner of proof was determined in advance by the alternative judgment which
left no room for a conflict of evidence.
73. See generally BRUNxER, GRUNDZUGE DER DEUTscHEN REcHTSGEScHicTE 21-25
(8th ed. Schwerin 1930).
74. Id. at 18. Thus, the judge was merely an "inquirer of the law," the parties con-
ducting the procedure and the Rachinburghi rendering the judgment.
75. If a party was dissatisfied with the judgment, he could challenge it, in which case
the decision was reached by ordeal, or, among some tribes, by duel. Unless the judgment
was thus challenged, the parties made a contract in accordance with the judgment: this
contract contained a promise either to prove or to pay.
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Thus, at this time, the oath, along with the ordeal, was the normal means
of proof. In contrast to the Romano-canonic procedure in which the oath was
rarely used, Germanic law used it even if other means of proof were avail-
able.76 In Roumania a man could escape judgment against him by taking an
oath, even if the plaintiff had witnesses ready to testify in his favor.77 And,
by virtue of a Saxon custom, a thief could swear with one hand that he did
not possess stolen property while holding it concealed under his clothes with
the other, and the plaintiff's demand that the defendant show the concealed
hand was not heard.
78
The early "Frankish" period until the establishment of Charlemagne's em-
pire was marked by Christianization of oath forms and a shift of emphasis
from party domination of judicial procedure to court intervention. 79 Instead of
raising his claim by invoking the pagan gods, the Frankish plaintiff was re-
quired-unless certain types of proof or suspicion were present-to offer and
take a preliminary oath, invoking God and the saints, taking the oath upon
relics or upon the Gospels. But pagan forms were still preserved for minor
oaths, such as the oath upon consecrated weapons and the oath upon cattle.
The party's demand of the oath and of judgment in return for the oath was
eventually replaced by a court order to the same effect. In Carolingian times
the so-called inquisitio-a procedure by questioning-was introduced. A royal
officer selected trustworthy community members who swore to tell the truth
and were thereupon asked to inform of crimes within the community. A per-
son thus informed against could purge himself by oath with oath-helpers or
by ordeal.
Significant changes in the nature and function of the oath-helpers took place
in the later era of Frankish supremacy. Proof with oath-helpers was made some-
what more difficult by requiring them to swear individually. But the oath-
taker's selection of compurgators was no longer limited to members of his
clan. In some cases, the opponent of the party who had been admitted to proof
could, by offering an oath with a larger number of oath-helpers, force his
opponent either to yield his proof privilege or take the oath with a like num-
ber of helpers. Conflict of testimony was resolved by a duel between the wit-
nesses. In an effort to increase the credibility of the compurgators, testimon-
ial capacity was made dependent upon certain property qualifications and the
witnesses were questioned before being admitted to oath. Thus, trials increas-
ingly featured a balancing of evidence.8 0
During the period from the establishment of the German Reich (887 A.D.)
until the end of the Middle Ages procedural formalism reached its peak and
76. Lvx', LA HtRARCHIE DES PREuVEs DANS LE DROIT SAVANT DU MOYEN-AGE
DEPUIS LA RENAISSANCE DU DROIT RowAIN jusQu'A LA FIN DU XIVE SIkcLE 132 (1939).
77. See id. at 132.
78. See id. at 132 n.5.
79. See BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 73, at 79-84.
80. For procedural details, see BRUNNER, FORSCHUNGEN ZUR GEscH IcHTE DES DEUT-
SCHEN UND FRANZbSISCHEN RECHTS 88-247 (1894).
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the oath figured prominently among the numerous form requirements.8' As in
the case of other verbal forms, strict adhrence to formule was stressed. And
the oath came to perform new functions. For example, the plaintiff's oath of
"gewere" ("with fingers and tongues") constituted a pledge that he would
not repeat the litigation over the same subject matter once it had been settled.
In its evidentiary role, the oath continued to be used by the parties (with or
without oath-helpers) and by witnesses. Later, toward the end of the Middle
Ages, the compurgators were gradually converted into witnesses. By way of
illustration, if a defendant had been apprehended in the act, the procedure
became transformed into a search for substantive truth. Thus, those who for-
merly functioned as oath-helpers were now required to have actual knowl-
edge of the act. A similar principle came to be applied to the "notorious"
act; notoriety was established by the testimony of witnesses. Nevertheless, if
the accused had not been caught in the act and the accusation was raised
without "fight greeting," he could defend by an oath and with the aid of com-
purgators.
Germanic procedure did not succeed in working its system of proof into
an adequate framework of substantive law, and yielded to the inquisitorial
canon law procedure.8 2 In the inquisitorial process physical torture merely
replaced the "tortura spiritualis" of the oath. Throughout history a feeling of
a continuity between these two institutions has prevailed. In modern law,
physical torture has been eliminated. But the tortura spiritualis may have
survived, since the administration of the oath may unduly summon up hidden
and painful portions of the psyche, particularly tendencies toward compulsive
confession.8 3
Similarly, the German "oath of purgation" has also survived in modern
testimonial proof. Contemporary witnesses are the successors of the ancient
compurgators. As these "oath helpers" functioned within an "oath" system, the
oath then became essential to the testimonial function. Indeed, in the German-
ic law the oath was always a constituent part of testimony. Capacity to testi-
fy was congruent with capacity to take an oath,84 and this concurrence re-
flected the original identity of the witnesses and the compurgator.85 The an-
cient view, based on a doctrine of formal proof, that only sworn testimony
carried full evidential weight, may also be found in modem legislation pro-
viding that unless a statutory ground for not requiring an oath exists, a
judgment may not be based on unsworn testimony. The judge is not permitted
to release the witness from taking an oath even though he may trust his un-
81. See BRUNNER, op. cit. suprac note 73, at 176-85.
82. Id. at 304.
83. REIK, R TUAL, PsYciao-AxALYric STUDIMs 167-219 (1931).
84. See L6WENTHAL, DER GmCHTsEm 21 (01929).
85. It is thus the institution of the "oath helper" which we find reflected in state-
ments regarding modern law, such as that of Faustin HIlie: "It is the oath that makes
a person a witness." 2 HALIE, CODE D'INSTRUCTlON CRaIMNELLE 147 (1952 ed.).
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sworn testimony or, indeed, even though he is convinced that the witness
is about to commit perjury.86
In contrast, the ancient Germanic oath requirements have in a few cases
served as a pattern for desirable modern legislation. In Germanic law, a party
submitted his oath to the opposing party, not to the court. This philosophy
of proof is reflected in modern provisions which permit the parties, by agree-
ment, to release a witness from the oath requirement.87 Those countries-
such as France-which received the Roman law at a rather early period do
not permit such release by consent.
Also of Germanic origin is the doctrine that perjury legislation is de-
signed to protect the purity of the oath, emphasizing the false invocation of
God as the essence of the crime."" Biblical and Roman perjury laws, on the
other hand, bad sought to aid the person who was affected by the false testi-
mony.
Canon Law
To a very considerable extent, the oath as a legal institution reached the
western world through the medium of the canon law, which in turn derived it
from three sources: supposed religious foundation, the ancient Germanic law,
and the Roman law.8 9
Whether the oath had any foundation in Christianity is couched in contro-
versy. Both Jewish 90 and Christian authorities 9 recognize that there is no
warrant in the Bible for the requirement of a witness's oath. In fact, several
Biblical passages suggest censure. For example, a clear condemnation of oath
taking generally is expressed in Christ's words:
86. See L6WENTrAL, op. cit. mfpra note 84, at 24-25.
87. See, e.g., CODEX JuPis CAoNIcI canon 1767, § 3, and sources cited in the second
part of this Article.
88. L6WENTHAL, op. ct. supra note 84, at 28.
89. See ESmEN, LE SERMENT DES INCULPtS DANS LE DROIT CANONIQUE 11 (1896),
in 7 BMLIOTHIQUE DE L'tCOLE DES HAUTEs ETUDES-ScIENCES RELIGIEUSES 231-48 (1896)
[hereinafter cited as Es=n]; 2 GARRAuD, TRAITt TH ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'INSTRUC-
TION CRIMINELLE Er DE PRoCIDURE PkNALE 49-50 (1909) [hereinafter cited as GARRAUD].
90. In Jewish law, as it interprets the Bible, the oath of the witness is unquestion-
ably not a condition of the validity of testimonial evidence. See Boaz Cohen, The Testi-
monial Oath, A Study in the Reciprocal Relatiogs of Jewish and Roman Law in Medie-
val Europe, 7 HISTORIA JUmAIcA 51 (1945). For criticism of taking an oath by God as
a witness, as implying an unwarranted assumption of a knowledge of God, see PnILo,
T.nE DECALOQUE §§ 82-95, in 7 PHILO 49-55 (Colson transl., Loeb ed. 1937). The super-
fluity of the oath has sometimes been argued on the ground of the general obligation of
every Jew to tell the truth, imposed by the oath of his ancestors at the Covenant of
Mount Sinai and the curses pronounced upon the conclusion of the Covenant. 'See Respon-
sum of R. Isaac ben Sheshet (1326-1408), cited in Boaz Cohen, supra at 58-59.
91. See the statement of the Council of Rome of 1725, cited in MORIARTY, OATHS
IN ECCLESIASTICAL CouRTS, AN HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS AND COMMENTARY 33 (Catholic
University of America Canon Law Studies No. 110, 1937) [hereinafter cited as MoRi-
ARTY].
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Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou
shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths;
But I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God's
throne:
Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it
is the city of the great King.
Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one
hair white or black.
But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever
is more than these cometh of evil.92
St. Paul remains the foremost Christian spokesman for the oath.03 He
stressed that God made his promise to Abraham under oath,94 and argued
that to men "an oath for confirmation is . . .an end to all strife.","; Among
the Church Fathers, Hieronymous claimed that Christ merely prohibited
swearing by heaven, earth, Jerusalem or one's own head, and not oaths in
general. This interpretation, which disregards the opening and closing words
of Christ's teaching was adopted by Gratianus in his Decretun Il and, in that
form, was approved by the Popes.9 7
Acceptance of the oath in Christianity was achieved only after a consider-
able struggle, and even then the acceptance was not unqualified. The contro-
versy was compromised by using a distinction made by St. Augustine. Accord-
ing to this view, only oaths taken to a falsehood or without necessity (fal-
sum, vel sine necessitate) were prohibited.9 8 With this exception, the oath was
merely an act of imperfection, not one of iniquity. Abstention from oath tak-
ing was recommended not on the ground that the oath was inherently evil
but rather because of the dangers it entailed. It was conceded to be a "neces-
sity" or a "medicine," which though disagreeable, was at times indispensable.
The canonists urged that the oath should be used only "in dubiis et necessariis,"
hence only as a subsidiary means of proof. A Decretale of Pope Alexander
III disapproved the practice of tendering the oath to a party who had pre-
viously established his claim by documents or witnesses, and then deciding in
accordance with the oath.99 In contrast, the Legists, approved the oath, not
merely on religious grounds, but because it was found in Roman sources.100
92. Matthew 5:33-37. Among the Church Fathers see also John Chrystostom, Honmi,
to the People of Antioch, XV, in THE HomILIEs OF S. JOHN CHRYSOSTOMI, ON THE
STATUTES, OR To THE PEOPLE OF ANTIocH 248, 260 (transl. by Members of the English
Church, Oxford, 1892). For further authorities see THUDICHUm 9.
93. See Roman-s 1:9; 2 Corinthians 1:23; 11:11, 31; Galatians 1:20; Philippians 1:8;
1 Thessalonians 2:5, 10; 1 Timothy 5:21.
94. See Hebrews 6:13.
95. See Hebrews 6:16.
96. Decretum Gratiani pars II, causa 22, quaetio ,1-5 & 8, cited in THnDIcHUm 10
n.3.
97. See id. at 10.
98. See LUvy, op. cit. supra note 76, at 135.
99. Cited in id. at 136.
100. Luther, Melanchton and most other leaders of the Reformation claimed that in
the cited Bible passage, Christ did not speak as a legislator. But they condemned the oath
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Under the impact of Germanic influences, the oath of the canon law as-
sumed, in criminal cases, the form of an oath of purgation. Before Gratian's
day, the decision to attempt purgation, in accordance with the ancient Ger-
manic pattern which was based on the accusatory, adversary system, depended
not so much on the will of the judge as on the will of the accused. 1'0 In the
course of time, however, the purgative oath was made compulsory by judi-
cial mandate. 10 2 A defendant who refused to take the oath or who could not
produce the required number of oath-helpers was deemed to have confessed.' 03
Yet, the oath was regarded as a rational means of proof. In this capacity as
purgatio canonica, it replaced the purgatio vnlgaris or ordeal by water or by
the iron, which had been prohibited in 1215.104 As in the Germanic system,
the oath of the accused was originally an ordeal proper-an oath that decided
the case.105 Knowledge, as such, was not in issue. Later, the oath became a
vow of the suspect de veritate dicenda (to tell the truth), with compurgators,
whose oath was a jusjurandum de credulitate, attesting to the character of
the suspect or to the compurgator-witness's belief in his cause.10 6
The oath de zeritate dicenda was an anomaly, and thus some writers deny
its existence in the canon law.10 7 That an oath sworn should not necessarily
carry proof, was so unusual that it was admissible only in the absence of
proof of guilt, that is, only where there was "probatio semiplena."'0 s It also
caused great discomfort among religious writers for theological doctrine had
steadily maintained that a man could not be required to incriminate him-
self.'0 9 If no duty of self-incrimination existed, theologians were initially
troubled by the apparent absence of basis of the authority to demand an
oath. By a rather unpersuasive argument, that authority was derived from
the inquisitorial function of the judiciary.110 Another question arose: since
theological doctrine admitted that "necessity" exempts, or at least excuses,
to the Pope and to religious orders, and denounced vows of poverty. They also declared
themselves not bound by their own oaths. See THuDicHums 56-7.
101. ESMEIN 11.
102. See MORIARTY 17-18.
103. EsmEiN 11.
104. See Concilium IV Lateran c. 18-Mansi, 22, 1007, cited in MORIARTY 16.
105. See MEMmIUS, DE IURAMENTO VERITATIS DIcENDAE IN cAUSIS CRIMINALIBUS REIS
NON PRAESTANDO No. 115, at 26; No. 203, at 50 (1698) [hereinafter cited as MM~ius].
106. MORIARTY 18-20.
107. Esmein's study is, on the other hand, devoted to proving that it did exist in that
law.
108. LYv, op. cit. supra note 76, at 141.
109. See Esm~iaN 9, 10.
110. See ibid. The procedure of this oath of the suspect was established by the Lat-
eran Council of 1215 as part of the system of inquiry and information against heretics.
Informers, frequently compensated, initiated the proceedings. The action began by demand-
ing from the suspect the oath to tell the truth. If he hesitated, he was asked whether he
regarded the oath in court as a sin. If he either answered in the affirmative or refused
to take the oath, he was deemed a proven heretic. DEcaRAlzs D. GlE-OI PApAE IX
SUA INTEGRITATI UNA CUm GLossls REsTITuTAE 1193 (1600) (bk. 5, tit. 7, ch. 13, § 7).
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otherwise illegal conduct, could an accused person defend himself falsely?
In his Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas argued that he who takes the
oath is not obligated to "tell the whole truth." He may remain silent, for
there is a difference between silence and falsehood. But where there has been
infamia, or express evidence of guilt, and he is asked to confess, he must
not conceal the truth."'
There is evidence of Church opposition to the accused's oath de veritate
dicenda even in medieval times. The Synod of Wroclaw (Breslau) held in
1248, censured this type of oath and demanded that proof against the accused
be adduced by the prosecution. 112 This opposition grew in strength, until in
1698, upon order of Pope Innocent XII, Franciscus Memmius made a thor-
ough inquiry into the question of the "expediency of abrogating the custom
of requiring accused persons, prior to interrogation, to take an oath to tell
the truth."' 3 He arrived at the conclusion that the custom should be abolish-
ed, since it was "violent and unjust." Memmius carefully distinguished this
type of oath from both the purgatory oath which put an end to the contro-
versy and a voluntary oath." 4 The difference, he said, was that the "neces-
sary" oath de veritate dicenda places the oath taker in "danger" and in
"fear,"" 5 to which he should not be exposed, whether his fear be "just or
unjust." Such oath "tortura est acerrina' "n 6 (is the gravest torture), "crude-
lior, quam tortura corporalis""' 7 (more cruel than bodily torture), in that
it tortures the soul by inflicting a fear of dishonoring God's Name. Inflicting
that fear is unjust, for nature has implanted in man an instinct of self-
preservation, which dictates that he exempt himself from punishment." 8
Indeed, says Memmius, when man finds himself in such state of necessity,
he "quasi invitus peierauerit" (perjures himself quasi-involuntarily), so that
he is immune from any perjury punishment." 0 Since about ninety of a
hundred accused persons were believed to commit perjury,'1 20 the judge who
exposes a defendant to such temptation "kills not only the soul of the accused
but also his own.' 2 1 Memmius significantly added that those who confess do
111. ST. THOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II, qu. 69, art. 2, at 257-58
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province transl. 1918).
112. See BoRowsKI, PRZYSIEGA DOWODO\VA W PROCESIE POLSKIM P6iNIEJSZEGO ARED-
NIOWIECZA 20 (1926).
113. MliMtus, cited in full note 105 supra.
114. See id. No. 41, at 8, 9; No. 78, at 17; No. 115, at 26; No. 203, at 50; Nos. 219,
220, at 53; No. 239, at 57.
115. Id. No. 95, at 20; No. 140, at 32; No. 203, at 50.
116. Id. No. 160, at 38.
117. Id. No. 162, at 38-39. Memmius apparently justified bodily torture, describing it
as a "species defetsionis." See id. No. 166, at 40.
118. Id. No. 51, at 11.
119. Id. No. 159, at 37-38.
120. Id. Nos. 124, 125, at 28.
121. Id. No. 101, at 21-22, citing St. Augustine (can. ille, qui hiominem, and can. qui
exigit 22; quest. 5) admonishing him, who provokes a man to swear and knows that he
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so for reasons other than fear of perjury. 122 Nor did he limit his criticism to
the accused's oath de veritate dicenda, even though it appeared to him the most
objectionable. Even the decisive purgatio canonica appeared to him "sus-
pected,"'1 3 and he suggested that the oath be abolished in civil as well
as criminal cases.
124
In the light of modem psychoanalytical knowledge and the contemporary
concept of human dignity, his findings are particularly relevant today. The hid-
den psychic conflicts called forth by the oath and the ritualistic impediment
it places on man's strivings toward freedom and rationality may be equally
termed "crudelior, quam tortura corporalis."
Under the pressure of such criticism, the oath of the accused (de veritate
dicenda) was abolished by the Council of Rome of 1725. The Council pro-
hibited tendering the oath to an accused in a criminal trial and declared that
if an examination were conducted under this oath, the examination and all the
acts of the process were null and void and lacked all binding force against
the criminal. However, the reason stated by the Council for abolishing the
oath of the accused was not that it was inherently immoral but rather that it
failed to extract truthful statements'
25
Today, the canon law in civil actions imposes a mandatory oath upon wit-
nesses, 26 and upon parties in contentious cases whenever the public good is
involved. Furthermore, the judge may require a party oath whenever he deems
it advisable in his prudent judgment. 2 7 The only witnesses of whom the
canon law does not require an oath are witnesses in a private trial if the par-
ties agree that they not be sworn,1 28 and unsuitable or suspected witnesses. 2 9
swears falsely, that he is committing an equivalent of homicide, and that he is killing two
souls. From this, the doctors infer that a judge should not refer an oath to a party who
may be thereby prejudiced; nor should he refer an oath to one who has no adversary.
Memmius mentioned that the judge may be excused if he acts in good faith, which may
result from the custom of imposing oaths. Id. No. 103, at 22. But he added that where
there is a high probability of perjury, as in the case of criminal defendants, there is a
ground for conjecture that the defendant will perjure himself, and in such cases the judge
must not impose an oath. Id. No. 106, at 23. Hence, such oath is generally barred in
criminal cases.
122. Id. No. 125, at 28.
123. Id. No. 203, at 50. Meemmius notes that purgatio is permissible, since it termi-
nates the controversy. This admission seems inconsistent with his general thesis concern-
ing the probability of perjury inherent in the oath of the accused. And he cites authorities
to the effect that the purgatio canonica had been abolished.
124. Id. No. 221, at 53. Memmius favored the oath's retention in spiritual matters
(causae spirituales). Id. Nos. 248, 249, at 60. He also argued that anyone who wishes to
swear should be admitted to the oath. Id. No. 227, at 54, citing St. Thomas and Suarez.
125. Concilium Romae, tit, XIII, caput. 2--Mansi, 34 B, 1872, cited in MORIARTY 33.
126. Canon 1767.
127. Canon 1744.
128. Canon 1767, § 3.
129. Canons 1757, § 1; 1758; ,1764 §§ 1-2.
When a witness refuses to swear, the judge may impose penalties, including monetary
fines. Canon 1766, § 2.
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The oath of witnesses (and parties in civil canonical trials) is presently de
veritate dicenda, the oath to tell the truth. By canon 1767, section 1, the oath
taker has this obligation; but he need answer only the questions asked. Clear-
ly, this privilege of silence originated in the compromise view of the oath
obligation adopted by theologians such as St. [Thomas Aquinas. While the
oath of the contemporary canon law is an oath in a modem sense, expected to
aid the search for truth it carries implications reminiscent of the ancient oath
ordeal. Although the oath is not an indispensable condition of validity,130 the
value of unsworn testimony is not considered equal to that of testimony un-
der oath. Thus section 2 of canon 1791 provides that even though witnesses
are absolutely trustworthy, give coherent depositions about matters of person-
al knowledge-the numerical requirement (two or three witnesses) being
also satisfied-they must be sworn in order that their testimony be taken as
full proof. This requirement gives the oath the character of a formal means
of proof, which the canon law has transmitted to civil-law countries. 131
While the evidentiary, testimonial oath of the canon law, combines elements
of legal proof with free judicial appraisal,132 its oaths for parties only, fol-
lowing the Roman law pattern, 133 are "probatory oaths" that decide the issue.
The "decisory oath" requires judicial approval and is admissable only in mat-
ters which can be disposed of by contract.134 The "suppletory oath" can be
ordered or permitted by the judge in the event that only half proof has been
presented and no other means of proof are available.135 It cannot be tendered
in criminal cases.13 6
Roman jurisprudence also pervades the canon law oath philosophy. It has
retained the character of the Roman law "sacrarnentuim" or the self-curse of
ancient law. It is thus defined by one writer: "He who takes the oath, ...
places his testimony in the hands of God Himself ... Whose unfailing justice
will punish, in time or in eternity, any deliberate falsehood which shall pass
his lips."'1 7 In contrast, however, to the Greek and Roman law, which re-
ferred perjurers to direct divine punishment, the canon law has introduced
elaborate provisions on the penalties of false testimony and perjury but these
penalties are spiritual-the Church ban, and denial of ecclesiastical burial-
not secular.'
38
130. See MORIARTY 41.
131. In the Roman law, however, there existed an inconsistency between the force
attributed to the oath and the principle of Hadrian's Rescript, instructing the judge to
decide "ex sententia animi tui."
132. Canons 1791, 1869.
133. See text at notes 61-66 supra.
134. Canons 1835, 10, 20, 30; 1836, § 10.
135. Canon 1829.
136. Canon 1830, § 2.
137. MORIARTY at IX.
138. Canons 1743, § 4; 1755, § 3; 1794.
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The Oath in French Law: Impact of the Revolution
An examination of the oath in France will shed light on parallel problems
in all continental countries, since the French Revolution had a decisive im-
pact on the civil law.
The history of the oath, in the territory that now is France, was not dis-
tinctive before the Enlightenment. In the early Germanic era, the focus had
been on the accused's oath of purgation in which he was supported by "oath
helpers" (co-jureurs) who gave the suspect "a certificate of morality.'
'139
Since the oath, as compared with the ordeal, was deemed the more "rational"
means of proof, the ordeal was employed only if compurgators were not avail-
able.'4 0
In the feudal era exculpation by "oath-helpers" became rare. Nevertheless,
the defendant was put under oath both in civil cases and in trials of minor
criminal offenses. 141 In the decision of major crimes both purgation and ordeal
yielded to trial by battle, an ordeal form in which appeal, supported by the
oaths of both parties, was made to the direct judgment of God.142 Since trial
by battle involved a risk of defeat for the accuser, many sought to prove their
causes by means of witnesses. The witnesses would repeat a formula stating
that the declarant was an eye-witness. His declaration then had to be confirmed
by an oath upon relics. 143 Testimony thus given was absolutely binding upon
the judge. It could be challenged only by an accusation of perjury which was
then decided by battle.
Later, when magistrates began to decide criminal cases by weighing the
testimony, there was introduced the "information" (dinonciation). Unlike the
direct accusation, this form of denunciation did not expose the informer to
responsibility in the event that the accusation proved groundless. Therefore,
in order to protect the accused against malicious secret denunciations, the
informer, in some parts of France was required to take the oath de calumnia
(to avoid false accusation of a crime). 144
Rejecting ordeals and compurgators as superstitious, the Church favored
the inquisitorial practice, as the means of implementing the divine mission of
finding the right judgment. The accused was thereby deprived of all rights
in the presence of a charismatic judge.145 Royal ordinances fossilized this pro-
139. 1 GARRAUD 41-42 (1907).
140. 1 GARRAUD 42.
141. EsIEIN, A HIsToRy OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 57 (Simpson transl.
1913) [hereinafter cited as EsmN-HIsroRY].
142. Combat "was applied to all the phases and all the actors in the procedure. One
battled with the accused, one battled with the judge in the case of a complaint of denial
of right; one battled with the witnesses." 1 GARRAUD 44.
143. Es=MN-HIsTORy 60.
144. 1 GARRAUD 47; MoIARrY 3-4, 9-10.
145. The Church regarded its judgment as the true judgment of God. This is the
psychological explanation of the transformation of the old Frankish procedure into the
Church's inquisitorial practice. I GARRAUD 50-51.
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cedure.14 6 As a corollary of the precious judicial art of the interrogatory, the
ordonnance criminelle (1670) imposed upon the accused the obligation to
take an oath, "assimilating him to a witness in his own cause.' 47 In oppo-
sition to this requirement, Lamoignon had pointed out that "if it is obligatory,
it will infallibly invite the accused to commit an additional crime and to add
to the untruth which is inevitable at such junctures a perjury which could be
avoided.' 148 But in Pussort's view, the oath seemed "not entirely useless,"
for "timid consciences are to be found which the fear of perjury might force
to acknowledge the truth."'149 This approach prevailed. The oath was deliber-
ately preserved as a tortura spiritualis--designed to extract a confession when
one was indispensable to imposition of the heavier sentences.
But the theological anti-oath arguments which condemned the tortura spin-
tualis and considered perjury excused by "necessity" because of the "right of
self-preservation," when set into the framework of a new ideology, proved ex-
tremely effective. That ideology was supplied by the Enlightenment. The
"self-preservation" argument apparently had a stronger appeal when it was
based on reason and human nature than when it was derived from a theologi-
cal "law of life."'150 Fashion, which is as significant in politics and law as in
art and dress, was a strong moving force. Thus, the French Encyclopedists
received with enthusiasm Beccaria's Dei delitti e delle pene, which set forth
"rationalistic" and "utilitarian" considerations for abolishing the oath.'0
"There is a palpable contradiction," he said "between the laws and the natural
sentiments of mankind in the case of oaths, which are administered to a
criminal to make him speafc the truth, when the contrary is his greatest in-
terest. '152 Since it is not in accordance with reason that man should prefer
immediate destruction to a remote religious retribution, the oath must be in-
effective as a means of eliciting the truth. 5 3 These ideas of Beccaria, which
purported "to follow the steps" of the "immortal Montesquieu" and to pro-
duce the Benthamite ideal of "the greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber,''154 were read by Voltaire "with infinite satisfaction."' 15"
146. Foremost among these ordinances was that of Louis XIV of August 1670, com-
monly called Ordonnance crininelle.
147. 1 GARRAUD 54.
148. This appeal for abolition of the compulsory oath of the accused resembles the
argument of the theologian Memmius.
149. See EsMEiN-HsToRY 224-26.
150. Id. at 358.
151. Id. at 364.
152. See BEcCArA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES & PUNISTMENTs 62 (Gould transl. 1809)
[hereinafter cited as BEccARA].
153. See BECCARIA 63. ("The motives which religion opposes to the fear of impending
evil and the love of life are too weak, as they are too distant, to make any impression
on the senses.")
154. BECCARIA 13.
155. See Commentary (attributed to Voltaire) in BEccARIA 137. Voltaire added a
humanitarian appeal for the oath's abolition. See id. at 187-90.
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Another important challenge to the oath of the accused was implicit in the
attack upon the system of legal proofs within which the oath operated. Strict
formal rules determined the force of each type of evidence. In this scheme,
the oath performed an important function. For example, in civil cases, two
witnesses were required to constitute "full proof," binding upon the judge.
If there was only one witness, i.e., "half proof," the missing half was supplied
by a suppletory oath. In criminal cases under the inquisitorial process, the
oath, though not decisive, was used to secure the decisive confession. This
system of proof was attacked on epistemological grounds. The reformers de-
manded "free evaluation of the evidence" or the system of "intimate con-
viction," in which the fact finder would not be bound by any particular type
of proof but could decide by independently scrutinizing the evidence. Formal
legal proof, intended to afford the moral certainty of facts, had become of
dubious value and the "probability, but which is called a certainty,"'15 6 that
replaced it, was thought to be "much easier to feel . . . than to define . . .
exactly." The jury, as a body endowed with a capacity for such special feel-
ing, was thought especially fit to apply the principle of intimate conviction.
The laymen's "common sense" evaluation of facts was to replace the artificial
thinking of professional judges who were assumed to have been prejudiced
by their training.1 57 Moreover, the same principle of intimate conviction was
to be applied by the judges when they functioned as fact-finders. In the En-
lightenment's reform movement the oath was found to be inconsistent with
the free evaluation of the evidence.
The Revolution implemented these theories with political action. The 1789
cahiers, reflecting general public opinion, demanded abolition of the accused's
oath, 58 describing it as "contrary to the natural sentiment of self-preserva-
tion common to all."'I5 9 By decree of the Constituent Assembly of October
8-9, 1789, the accused was no longer required to take an oath, except an
oath in the nature of a juramentum cahmniae, "when he wishes to object
to the competency of the witnesses."' 160 In dealing with the suspect's inter-
rogation, 1791 legislation provided that he shall not be required to take an
oath to tell the truth, for "common sense suffices to convince of the useless-
ness and immorality of such oath, which places the suspect between perjury
and punishment. . . ."I' Nor was the questioner to indulge in any "ensnar-
156. BECCAMIA 146-47.
157. Of course, moral and political reasons were also advanced in favor of jury trial.
Anglophilia caused the jury to be viewed as a remedy against all injustice. EsMEIN-
HISTORY 369. See also BEccAmIA 47 ("It is an admirable law which ordains that every
man shall be tried by his peers; for, when life, liberty and fortune, are in question, the
sentiments which a difference of rank and fortune inspires should be silent.").
158. EsMEiN-HisTORY 397-98.
159. City of Paris, "Cahier du Tiers, II, 162," cited in EsmN-HisToRy 398.
160. Art. 12, cited in EsMEEN-HIsToRY 405.
161. Instruction of October 21, 1791, implementing the Decree on Procedure by Jury,
cited in 1 GAPu.uj 71.
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ing question" (question captieuse), for he was to receive "the free declara-
tion of the suspect." This type of interrogation was deemed to fit into the
general system of preuves de conviction (proof by persuasion), which was
substituted for the previous system of formal legal proof.162 This change
is reflected in the formula of the oath required of jurors: "You swear . . .
to decide in accordance with the charges and the means of defense and in
conformance with your conscience and your inner persuasion, with the im-
partiality and firmness fitting a free man."'
163 One revolutionary statute 1.4
went so far as to abolish the oath of witnesses and to require merely a simple
"promise to tell the truth"-a promise to be made under the sanction of the
testimony being deemed a nullity. However, this sweeping reform was soon
abandoned. The Code d'instruction criminelle of 1808 required an oath of
witnesses and, indeed, strict abidance by the statutory oath formula.
Throughout subsequent legislative changes and landmark events, 6 5 two
concepts have been preserved in French law: the prohibition against putting
an accused in a criminal case under oath, and the principle of intinle con-
viction.'66 In the Napoleonic era, these two principles were carried to other
countries of continental Europe. To be sure, Germany had been the first to
cease administering the oath to the accused. 167 And, France has not aban-
doned either the oath of the witness or the decisive party oath in civil cases,
nor granted as extensive concessions to those nonconformists who ob-
jected to oaths as did some other countries.'68 But the impact of the French
Revolution, spiritually as well as geographically, introduced a decisive change
of attitude toward the oath which has been the source of many reform move-
ments aimed at limiting or abolishing the oath. 69 By way of example, when
Poland recently introduced the "promise to tell the truth" in lieu of the oath, she
clearly copied the French revolutionary Code du 3 Brumaire An IV.170
162. Law of September 25-October 6, 1791, cited in 1 GARRAUD 69, 74.
163. The instruction regarding the jury said: "The jurors owe the judge respect and
deference . . . but they do not owe him at all the sacrifice of their opinion for which
they are accountable solely to their conscience." 1 GARRAUD 75.
164. Code du 3 Brumaire an IV, in 3 LEs CODES ANNoTrs DE Snmiy 98 (1877).
165. E.g., the CODE D'INSTRUcrioN CRimINELLE of 1808, the Law of December 8, 1897,
the abolition of the jury and the introduction of tribunals composed of professional and
lay judges deliberating as a body. See 1 LE PoirravN, DICTIONNAIRE-FORMaULAIRE DES
PARQUETS Er DE A POLICE JUDICIA E 1144-46 (8th ed. 1954).
166. ,See notes 205-13 infra and accompanying text.
167. Muyart de Vouglans, cited in Esm~iN-HIsToRY 372, states that Germany relin-
quished the practice on the ground "that it is presumable that a person who has been
capable of committing the crime is capable of committing perjury to conceal it."
168. On this see text at notes 187-88 infra.
169. Thus, when countries of the Soviet bloc abolished the oath, they did so on the
ground that it is inconsistent with the system of free evaluation of the evidence, in which
they take particular pride. Although they claim that system as their own, it was known
not only in the Roman and in the Canon law, but was institutionalized in Civil law
countries by the French Revolution.
170. See text at note 164 supra.
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The Oath Controversy in Continental Europe After the Revolution
The oath institution has historically been challenged on several grounds:
religion, humanistic ethics and legal policy.
The Religious Issue
Although it was introduced into civil law systems through an essentially
religious medium-the canon law-the oath became the subject of great re-
ligious controversy after the middle of the eighteenth century. According to
one view, religious references in the oath were inconsequential additions that
did not affect its essence;171 the religious oath formula did not even imply
a theistic attitude. 172 Moderates maintained that it was at least possible to
secularize the oath by omitting religious references. In the extreme opposing
view, even omission of all express religious content could not deprive the
oath of its essentially religious connotation. Assuming that the terms "I
swear" may be assigned any chosen meaning, some commentators have raised
the question of what that meaning is if it is not religious: "the so-called 'secu-
lar oath formula' has either a religious meaning ... or no meaning at all."'
173
These divergent positions have all found legal expression. The view pre-
vailing in French law is that whatever importance may be attributed to the
secular elements in the oath, its religious quality is the principal source of the
credit given to testimony thereunder. Even where the oath formula does not
refer to God, the oath "preserves its religious foundation and is taken quasi deo
teste.' 74 In Germany it was said that the terms "to swear" and "oath" have,
in themselves a religious meaning.' 75 The Swiss Federal Council, 7 6 on the
other hand, held that the formula "I swear" does not have a religious char-
acter, so that requiring a citizen to take the oath in this form, without addi-
tion of phrases such as "So help me God" does not violate the provision of the
Swiss Federal Constitution that "no one may be compelled . .. to perform
a religious act."'
177
Of the oath's religious formula., "So help me God" does not express any
particular monotheistic creed. Its generality and moderation contrast favor-
171, See Stenographic Report of the Frankfurter Nationalversammlung 1848, vol. 3,
para. 1644, col. 1, cited in L6WENTHAL, DER GEmCHTSEID 48 n.2 (1929).
172. Baehr, in 51 PREUSSISCHE JAHRBUCHER para. 292, 293, cited in LWENTHAL,
op. cit. supra note 171, at 49 n.3.
173. Id. at 49.
174. See 2 ENcYcL.orPbE DALLOZ, RtPERTonz DE DRoIT CRImINEL ET DE PROCPDURE
PkNALE Serment 846 (1954). Compare the Roman view expressed by CICERo, D- OF-
Ficns bk. III, fr. 29 (Loeb ed. 1928).
175. See Windhorst's remarks in the Reichstag in 1878, cited in HEGLER, Die Eides-
reform, in TOBINGER ABHANDLUNGEN ZUAI OFFENTLICHEN R cHT 57-58 n.140 (1929).
176. Conseil f9dral-Bwzdesrat is the highest directive and executive authority of
the Swiss Federation. FEDERAL CoNST. art. 95.
177. Swiss FEDERAL CoNsT. art. 49. See decisions cited in BURClHARDT, KOMaMENTAR
DER SCHWEIzERiSCHiEN BUNDESVERFASSuING VoU 29. MAI 1874, at 452 (3d ed. 1931).
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ably with the manifold variants of historical formulae. In pagan times oaths
were taken on diverse objects and by many gods. After the introduction of
Christianity, they were taken by the Gospels, by all the Saints, by specific
Saints, by the Holy Virgin, and so on. Often they included atrocious self-
curses. 178 Formulae which deviated even slightly from the prescribed form
were not tolerated. Occasionally, however, members of deviant religious groups
were permitted to be sworn by special rites. But these rituals reflected the
antagonism of the community to the oath-taker rather than deference to his
religious view. Particularly humiliating were the oaths administered to
Jews.17 9 Thus it was a mark of progress when Emperor Joseph II of Austria
provided in 1782 that "henceforth, everywhere no other oath formula must
be used but 'So verily help me God.' "180 This formula was to be used by
every oath taker, regardless of his religious persuasion. Other countries fol-
lowed Austria's example.' 8 ' In this way, the indignities of the oath were some-
what mitigated.
Introduction of the uniform religious formula, however, raised new prob-
lems. In Prussia in 1880 a Lutheran minister, testifying in a Wittenberg
court before a Jewish judge, insisted on saying: "I swear it, so verily help
178. For examples of the oaths taken in paternity matters see SpoERRY, DAS VER-
SCHWINDEN DES BEWEISEIDES Im ZURCHRISCHEN ZIVILPROZESS SEIT DER REFORMATION
43-44 (1941) [hereinafter cited as SPOERRY]. In swearing, the woman was required to
say:
If I swear falsely and unjustly, then . . . God the Father, my creator, God the
Son, my Redeemer shall no longer come to my aid when my body and soul in the
last end are separated from each other; . . . the sacred and bitter suffering and
death of the Lord Jesus Christ . . . shall be lost to me and I shall find no con-
solation for it in all eternity and my sins shall not be purified or washed away by
the precious blood of Jesus Christ; . .. God shall never help me when I stand as
a perjurer on the Last Day or Judgment with fear, trembling and sadness and my
body and soul is judged before the severe Judgment of God and I shall be thrown
into the glowing fire, prepared for the devils and all damned and be robbed of the
joyful sight of Eternal Grace and God's sight in Eternity.
After she swore such an oath, the man had to acknowledge paternity of the child.
179. Some of the oath practices required of Jews were spitting on the circumcised
genitals, see FRANKEL, DIE EIDESLEISTUNG DER JUDEN 69 (1847), and standing barefeet
on a raw pig hide, see ScHWABExSPIEGm. art. 263 (Gangler ed. 1875) (a 13th century
law book).
180. See HANDBUCH ALLER UNTER K. JOSEF II. ERGANGENER VERORDNUNGEN UND
GEsETZE 4, 237 (1785-1790).
181. -France omitted self-curses, see, e.g., CODE D SiNTRUcrION CRIMINELLE (Code of
Criminal Procedure) of 1808, and introduced uniform formulze for each category of oath-
takers, see CODE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE (1808), as amended by the Law of Feb. 16,
1933 (D.P. 1933.4.51), art. 312 (jurors); art. 75, 155 (witnesses.). See also FR CODE
OF CIVIL PROC. art. 35. For these formula see note 185 infra.
The German Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure of 1877, § 443 and § 62 respec-
tively, introduced the formula: "The oath begins with the words, 'I swear by God the
Almighty and Omniscient,' and ends with the words, 'so verily help me God."'
The Norwegian Law of May 3, 1893, introduced the formula: "I swear this, so verily
help me God the Almighty and Omniscient." See THUDICRUM 117.
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me God by Jesus Christ." The judge ruled that the oath was invalid, since it
contained an addition not given in the statutory formula, and he fined the
minister for refusing to take the required oath. His decision was reversed.' 82
In 1884, the Reichsgericht held that additions to the formula do not affect the
validity of the oath so long as they do not contradict or limit its meaning or
add a reservation. 83 This view has been criticized as introducing an element
of inequality among the oath takers.18 4 In France today any deviation from
the oath formula, however slight, renders the testimony invalid; if the judg-
ment depends on that testimony, it is reversible.,' 5
182. THUDICHUM 109.
183. Id. at 111.
184. See id. at 112-13. Thudichum is particularly concerned with the effect produced
in the popular mind when one juror adds to the legal formula "So help me God" the
phrase "and all Saints," another "and Saint Peter," and a third one, "and the Holy Vir-
gin," etc.
185. 1. GARRAUD 593. Before the Judge-Investigator, before the Tribunal correction-
iwe and Tribunal de police, witnesses swear "to tell the whole truth, nothing but the
truth." FR. CODE OF CaM. PRoc. arts. 103, 446 & 536, Law No. 57-1426, Dec. 31, 1957,
[1958] Journal Officiel 258, as amended and completed, Ordinance No. 58-1296, Dec. 23,
1958, [1958] Journal Officiel 11711. Before the Cour d'assises they swear "to speak with-
out hate and without fear, to tell the whole truth, nothing but the truth." FR. CODE OF
CrA. PROc. art. 331, para. 3. Experts, on the other hand, swear to "accomplish their
mission to make their report and to give their opinion on their honor and conscience."
Fn. CODE OF CRIu. PROC. art. 160, para. 1. In civil cases witnesses swear "to tell the
truth." FR. CODE OF CIVIL PRoc. art. 263, para. 2, as amended, Decree No. 58-1289, Dec.
22, 1958, [1958] Journal Officiel 11608. In Procureur g6n6ral pros la cour d'appel de Pau
c. Dame Fengas et Costedoat, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Feb. 16, 1950, [11950] Dal-
loz Jurisprudence [hereinafter cited as D.] 213 (Fr.), upon appeal of the Procureur
G~n~ral from an acquittal on a charge of abortion, and complicity in abortion, the court
held that the statement in the judgment reciting that the witness was heard after having
"taken the oath in conformance with law" (con.forixfiwnt a la loi) violated the require-
ment of art. 155 of former law, for "in view of the diversity of the formula provided
for by law, this statement is insufficient to establish that the witness, whose testimony
was relied on [in the judgment], took the oath according to the terms of article 155;
the judgment is, therefore, invalid." But the Chambre criminelle held a statement that
the witness was heard after having taken the oath "in conformance with article 155,
Code d'instruction- criminelle" to be sufficient. Janton v. Min. publ., Cour de Cassa-
tion (Ch. crim.), May 27, 1933, [1933] Dalloz Recueil Hebdomadaire 381 (Fr.). Testi-
mony under oath to tell "the truth, nothing but the truth" rather than "the whole truth,
nothing but the truth" was held invalid. Lacascade, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Jan.
25, 1912, [1912] D. V (Sommaires) 28 (Fr.). Even before the tribunal de simple police,
a statement in the judgment that the witnesses simply swore to "tell the truth" was held
reversible error. Platet, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), March 2, 1950, [1951] Sirey
Recueil G6n~ral I. 104 (Fr.). The oath formula for experts need not be observed quite
as rigidly as that for witnesses. But a statement in a judgment rendered by a tribunal
de simple police that the expert "took an oath in court on June 30, 1949," was held in-
sufficient, CODE D'INsTRUCrION CRIMINELLE art. 44 being interpreted as requiring terms at
least "resembling those which evince from the wording used by the legislator." Dame
Chartier, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Aug. 7, 1951, [1951] D. 588 (Fr.).
Since deviations continue to occur, this oath formalism has been a source of consider-
able annoyance to appellate courts. Maurice Patin, President of the Chambre criminelle
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"By taking the oath man invokes God as a witness of his sincerity and
implicitly offers himself as subject to divine vengeance in the case of per-
jury."'18s This statement probably reflects the predominant theory in civil
law countries. In partial acknowledgment, all countries that recognize the
oath afford more or less far-reaching concessions to religious dissenters.
They may be sworn in accordance with the rites of their own religion.
8 7
Those who object to the oath on religious grounds or because they are non-
believers are usually permitted to take it without a religious clause.185 But
a witness may not refuse a simple affirmation or a testimonial oath that lacks
of the Cour de Cassation, reporting in Procidure Crindnelle, REVUE DE SCIEN cE CRIMI-
NETTE rr DE DRoiT PANAL Com1PRA 638, 639 (1958), states that it is "depressing for
the Cour de cassation to have to reverse a judgment of a Cour d'assises and order a
new trial simply because the witnesses swore to tell 'the truth, nothing but the truth,'
whereas they should have sworn to tell 'the whole truth, nothing but the truth."' He
adds that "one might say that this is a matter of mere form," but that "we must not
forget that observation of forms is one of the fundamental guaranties of liberty."
186. VIru, PROCDUPE PtNALE 198 (1957).
187. Privileges are granted in France to Jews, Muslims, Anabaptists and Quakers
upon request. See 2 ENCYcLOP-DiE DALLoz, op. cit. supra note 174, at 846-47. France
does not require, but merely permits, members of non-conformists groups to follow the
rites of their own religion. 2 id. at 847.
It has been said that such a person cannot be prevented from taking the oath in ac-
cordance with the rite common to all Frenchmen, "for it would be unfair to him to claim
that his conscience is not bound by such an oath, when he makes assurances to the con-
trary' Cited in 2 GARsoNNET & CzAR-BRu, TRAIT9 TEltORIQUE ET PRATIQUTE DE PRO-
CLDURE cwVE rr COSmERciALE 570 (3d ed. 1912). The German STRAmOrZESSORDNUNG
(Code of Criminal Procedure) § 66e, provides that where a "witness declares that he is
a member of a religious sect which the law permits the use of certain affirmation formulm
in lieu of an oath, the affirmation made in accordance with the formula of such religious
sect is deemed equal to an oath." See also German ZrLPRaOZESSORDuNG (Code of Civil
Procedure) § 484. The formula or rite for the sect must be observed, or a judgment
based on it will be a nullity. See ScHnSmi, LEHRO-MMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
UND zum GERIcnTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ comment to § 66e, at 159-60 (1952).
188. The former Swiss Federal Law on Federal Procedure (Law of November 22,
1850, concerning Procedure before the Federal Tribunal in Civil Litigation) was con-
sidered automatically amended by enactment of the constitution of 1874, so as to permit
refusal to take an oath containing a religious clause. See BURCKHARDT, op. cit. SUpra
note 177, at 452. There is no oath in the present Swiss Federal Civil Procedure. Bundes-
gesetz fiber den Bundeszivilprozess vom 4. Dezember 1947, BUNDESRECETSPFLGE 53-74
(Bundeskanzlei ed. 1953). In criminal procedure anyone required to swear may take a
vow instead of an oath. Bundesgesetz fiber die Bundesstrafrechtspflege vom. 15. Juni 1934,
art. 86, BIJNDESRECHTSPFLEGE 92 (Bundeskanzlei ed. 1953).
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, adopted art. 136, sub-
div. 4, of the Weimar Constitution, whereby "no one may be compelled to a Church act
or ceremony or participation in religious practices or to use of a religious oath formula."
Hence, STRAYPROZRSSORDNUNG (Code of Criminal Procedure) § 66c(2), Law of Sept.
12, 1950, [1949-1950] Bundesgesetzblatt 636, states that "[T]he oath may be taken also
without a religious affirmation." ZIVIPROZESSORDNUNG (Code of Civil Procedure) § 481




a religious clause on the ground that in his view both carry religious implica-
tions and that he is a non-believer. Such an oath has been held either not to
be a religious act 189 or to be both a civic and a religious act.190 Norway is
an example of the more lenient jurisdictions. There, legislation has long pro-
vided that a person who refuses to swear on the ground that the oath is con-
trary to his religious persuasion or because he does not believe in an al-
mighty and omniscient God-even though the witness is still a member of the
state church-shall affirm upon his honor and conscience, subject to the same
responsibility that attaches to the taking of a religious oath.191
Catholic and most Protestant religious authorities are not opposed to use
of the oath by the state; indeed, some favor it as an affirmance of religious
influence in secular matters. 19 2 Since most sectarian and atheistic objections
tc' the oath are met by various provisions granting relief to the objectors,
religious opposition to the oath has, in the course of time, ceased to be a
serious practical issue.
Ethical and Humanistic Objections to the Oath
The most weighty objections to the oath have been raised by secular philo-
sophers, humanists and humanitarians. Kant, in part reflecting earlier eccle-
siastical arguments, stigmatized the oath as "tortura spiritualis"'193 and as
"civil blackmail,"'1 4 based on exploitation of a superstition. He also chal-
lenged the right of the legislature to authorize judges to require the oath,
claiming that compulsion to take the oath violates "inalienable human free-
dom."'1 5 Fichte also implicitly condemned the immoral role which the State
assumes in administering the oath.'
9 6
Utilitarian rationalists, among them Beccaria and other continental Bent-
hamites, stressed the irrationality of the oath requirement. They pointed out
189. See holdings of the Swiss Federal Council, cited note 177 supra. According to
the German interpretation, the taking of an oath is not "a religious practice." See
SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 187, comment 1 to § 66c, at 158.
190. ENCYcLOPfDIE DALLOZ, op. cit. supra note 174, at 847 n.7.
191. See Noa. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. §§ 188, 197(5) (1887), as amended, Act of May
10, 1893, No. 2; NoL. CODE OF CiviL PRoc. §§ 219, 247(4), Act of Aug. 13, 1915, No. 6.
In the case of those whose refusal to swear is based on individual grounds the court
must inquire into the earnestness of their convictions.
A more recent Norwegian statute declares that for members of religious sects who
reject both the oath and the affirmation on honor and conscience, the oath formula shall
be determined by the King. NOR. CODE OF OATH No. 1 (1893), as amended, Act of April
29, 1905, No. 1. [Information supplied by Adam Vestberg, Secretary to Ministry of jus-
tice in Denmark, and during 1958-1959, a Graduate Fellow at the Yale Law School.]
192. See HEGLER, op. cit. supra note 175, at 26, 28 n.159.
193. 8 KANT, METAPHYsIscHE ANFANGSGRONDE DER RECHTSLEHRE § 40 (Rosenkranz
ed. 1838).
194. KANT, DIE RELIGION INNERHALB DER GRENzEN DER BLOSSEN VERNUNFT 190
(Kirchmann ed. 1869).
195. 8 KANT, op. cit. supra note 193, § 40.
196. See FICHTE, GRUNDLAGE DES NATURPEcHTS 139-40 (1797).
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that punishment for perjury is often less disadvantageous to the declarant
- than would be the results of truthfulness.
197
More recent arguments have invoked the aid of ethnological and anthro-
pological knowledge. It has been said that the oath is not a truly religious
institution, for it is not an expression of man's relationship to a personal God
and does not actually invoke him as a witness. Rather it carries the mystical-
magic meaning of a "self curse" in which man stakes himself, his life, his
salvation or some other precious possession (originally, his weapon or his
horse) as a pledge of truth. The oath taker thereby uses superhuman forces,
which harm him if he lies.' 98 Reliance on such supernatural powers is in-
consistent with twentieth century man's strivings toward rationality.
The most powerful argument advanced against the oath has been the one
based on the proposition that the requirement postulates a distorted image of
man, one of an unworthy, undignified, contemptible creature. This challenge
to the oath is implicit in Kant's belief that man has an absolute duty of truth-
fulness which transcends any ulterior purpose. 199 Of course, the idea of a
"rational man" conceived in this Kantian view differs from that of the ration-
ally calculating egoist of the utilitarian school. A more utilitarian version of
the Kantian position may be found in Fichte's doubt that a statement uttered
under oath is any more reliable than unswor testimony, if given by an un-
trustworthy declarant.
2 0 0
Adherents of the oath answered the challenge that it is an institution based
on "superstition," and therefore immoral, by arguing that while superstition
is primitive, it is not ipso facto reprehensible as immoral.2 01 They met the
criticism of the oath as violative of liberty and equality by saying that the
substitutes proposed for the oath, the affirmation for example, are subject to
the same criticism, for they too interfere with liberty and operate unequally in
the case of different individuals.20 2 And the rationalistic utilitarian criticisms
are easily shown to be a result of decline of religious influences. When re-
ligion is a potent force in men's minds, the very premise of the rationalistic
argument, that a lesser disadvantage attaches to perjury than to truthfulness,
is absent. And recent psychology has made it appear doubtful that man will
invariably lie just because the evil he fears as a consequence of perjury is
smaller than that which he anticipates as a result of truthfulness.
The decisive argument-the one that ultimately prevailed over repeated
reform projects-is that the oath affords "a particular safeguard to truth
finding" and that "the State should not forego utilizing this means of in-
197. See text at 52-54 sapra.
198. See HmLER, op. cit. supra note 175, at 24, 25.
199. See KANT, RELIGION INNEREXALB DER GRENZEN DER BLOSSEN VERNUNFT 2 (1st
ed. 1798).
200. FIcHTE, op. cit. supra note 196, at 139 ("[A] person who is capable of publicly
affirming a falsehood will swear a false oath as well").
201. See HEGLER, op. cit. supra note 175, at 27.
202. Id. at 28.
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fluencing the witness. °20 3 Those considerations of utility have afforded the
most effective support of the oath institution in continental Europe. Of course,
if paramount significance is attributed to such "utility," then the value of the
oath might at least superficially be said to be enhanced rather than weakened
by its foundation upon a superstition, for superstitions often have a more
forceful impact upon men than explicit worldly sanctions.
Legal Policy Arguments
The principal legal criticisms of the oath during the post-revolutionary
period on the continent were that it conflicts with the principle of free evalu-
ation of the evidence and that it produces a virtual "pestilence of perjury."
The first objection must be considered in the light of the historical back-
ground of the oath. The oath of purgation had operated as a formal means of
proof which governed the judge's decision. It was an ordeal, not a form of
invoking a "Judgment of God." Even after this oath of purgation disappeared
in criminal cases, its corollary in civil cases, the decisive party oath, was pre-
served in the canon law and in the legal systems of civil law countries. But
the trend prevailing at present is to limit or exclude the party's decisive oath
entirely. Several countries have replaced it with the English rule permitting
parties in civil cases to testify "as witnesses in their own case" and admitting
them to a testimonial oath.
2 0 4
Wholly aside from the formal, decisive party oath, the question has been
raised whether even a testimonial oath, which is not decisive of the issue but
undoubtedly has some impact on the judicial mind, is consistent with the
principle of "free evaluation of the evidence" ("intine conviction" or "freie
Beuleiswiirdigung").20° Clearly, under this principle, a judge is perfectly free
to believe the unsworn testimony of one witness in preference to the sworn
testimony of another °.20  But the scope of that freedom has been differently
conceived in successive periods of legal history as the prevailing notions of
judge and jury functions have varied. In the heyday of its popularity in civil
law countries, the jury was thought to be divinely endowed with a unique
fact-finding ability. Indeed, the view that the "twelve men good and true"
represent the twelve Apostles and are inspired by Grace and guided by the
light of the Holy Spirit was seriously advanced.2 0 7 Echoes of this view are
found in the classic form of instruction which the chairman of a French jury
203. Protokolle der Reformkommission 1905, vol. I, § 47, cited in HFGLER, op. cit.
supra note 175, at 68.
204. This Civil Law phenomenon will be discussed in the second part of this Article.
205. "Free evaluation of the evidence" was introduced into modern civil law by the
French Revolution as part of a comprehensive system of reform, particularly as incident
of jury trial. Basically, it means that there are no formal methods of proof. See 2 VIDAL,
CoURS DE DROn" CRIMINEL ET DE SCIENCE PtNITENTrrIAn 1043 (9th ed. Magnol 1949).
206. See ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZMLPROZESSRECHTS No. 564, at
363 (6th ed. 1954).
207. GRAvEN, L'Oblgation de parler en justice, in DROIT Er WRIT 109 (1946).
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was required to read to the jurors.20 8 This instruction exhorted them that "in
silence and in self-communion they ask themselves and in the sincerity of their
conscience seek for the impression which the evidence adduced against the
accused and the means of defense have made upon their mind." However, as
enthusiasm for the jury waned, 2 9 the views of proper jury discretion were
revised. It was denied that "free evaluation" by juries meant determination
by sheer emotional reaction.210 Although the same jury instruction was held to
be equally applicable to judges, they were obliged to state the bases on which
they reached their fact findings, so as to afford an opportunity for review.' 1'
Since today "intimate conviction" "does not relieve [the judge of the require-
ment of using] a logical method in evaluating the evidence submitted to
him,"2 12 he must supply persuasive rational-and not merely emotional-
grounds for his trust in a particular witness and his lack of confidence in an-
other. In this context the fact that one witness testified under oath while
another was not sworn can hardly be disregarded. For that reason, the oath
has been thought to be even more inconsistent with "free evaluation of the
evidence," when that evaluation must satisfy a rationality standard than when
it is interpreted-as it was previously-to consist of a purely intuitive method
of fact finding. Moreover, various legal rules indicate a preference for sworn
testimony. The fact finder cannot disregard this preference even within the
framework of "free evaluation." Thus, French commentators have termed the
208. It was also to be affixed in the jury room. French CODE D'IISTRUCrION CRIMtI-
NmLE art. 342 (repealed in 1941). This instruction read in full as follows:
The law does not call jurors to account for the means by which they have been
persuaded; it does not prescribe any rules on which they must specifically make
dependent the completeness and the sufficiency of proof; it provides that in silence
and self-communion they ask themselves and in the sincerity of their conscience
seek [to find] what impression the evidence adduced against the accused and the
means of defense have made upon their mind. By no means does the law tell them:
You shall take to be true a fact attested to by a given number of witnesses; You
must not consider as sufficiently established any proof which was not adduced by
a given type of report, a given document, a given number of witnesses or a given
number of clues; it does not ask them any questions but a single one, which con-
tains the full measure of their duties: Do you have an intimate conviction?
This instruction, except the sentence "By no means ... given number of clues," has been
restored by the new FR. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 353. It is now read by the president
of the tribunal to "judges," not only "jurors."
209. The jury has been severely criticized by the positivist school of criminology.
GAROFALO, CRIMINOLOGY 355-64 (Miller transl. 1914); FERa, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY 485-
97 (Kelly & Lisle transl. 1917). As a result, it has been replaced in many civil law juris-
dictions by professional and lay judges deliberating together.
210. GARRAUD 516-17.
211. See, e.g., the FR. CODE D'I STRucriON CRImINELLE arts. 163, 195; the German
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG § 267, supra note 188; the Spanish CODE OF CRIeM. PROC. art. 741,
Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal of February 11, 1881, published by virtue of the Real
Decreto of June 22, 1882, in 2 MAJADA, MANUAL DE FORmULARIOS PENALES 173 (1956).
212. VITU, op. cit. supra note 186 at 188.
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distinction drawn between witnesses who testify under oath and unsworn
witnesses a survival of the system of "preuves legales" (formal legal proof)
and incompatible with the system of intimate conviction.213
Much as incompatibility of the oath with the evaluation of evidence "ex
sententia anind tui" (by the judgment of your [intuitive] mind) was already
noted in Roman law, so the tendency of the oath institution to produce a
virtual "perjury pestilence" was observed before the era of enlightenment. The
theological writer Memmius estimated perjury to occur in ninety of a hundred
criminal cases. He, like Beccaria at a later date, thought that where self-
preservation is at stake, perjury was natural, inevitable and hence excusable.
But perjury occurs far beyond situations of necessity, perhaps as a result of
indiscriminate use of the oath in trifling matters. Among the several alterna-
tive means of coping with the perjury problem, that one which tends to reduce
the scope of the crime and therefore the number of punishable instances de-
serves particular notice, both as a method of economy of punishment and as
a means of restoring to the oath its proper role. Ernst Ferdinand Klein, a
noted jurist and a collaborator on the Prussian codes, advocated the aboli-
tion of all promissory oaths and, among the judicial oaths, all those required
in criminal and minor civil cases. In important civil cases, he thought swear-
ing could be abolished, so long as a party might demand that a witness swear
to a particular sentence. He also demanded that affirmation on honor and con-
science be sanctioned by legal penalties. 214 Such reform projects had a special
impact on the development of modern civil law legislation.
HISTORY OF THE OATH IN ANGLO-AmERICAN LAW
The development of the oath practice in common law countries was decise-
ly influenced by Germanic practices. Naturally enough, in view of the Anglo-
Saxon heritage, early procedure in England was but a variant of the ancient
Germanic procedure. Even that distinctive English feature-the jury trial-
grew out of Germanic oath practices. Later, the canon law served as a medium
whereby continental ideas reached the common law. A marked parallelism
of ideas between the civil-law and common-law systems, confirms theories of
cross-fertilization.
Early Methods of Proof: The Oath
The earliest form of trial in England was "a proceeding between the par-
ties, carried on publicly, under forms which the community oversaw. They
listened to complaints which often must follow with the minutest detail cer-
213. See BOUZAT, TRAITA THoRIQuE ET PRATIQuE DE DROIT P NAL NO. 1094, at 739
(1951) ; DoINEDIEU DE VABRES, PRkIS DE DROIT cRImINnL No. 974, at 353-54 (2nd ed.
1951) ; 2 ViAL, op. cit. supra note 205, at 1060.
214. Klein, Ober die Eide, in 1 VERmiscHT AB3ANDLUNGEN DBER GEGENSr.XNDE DER
GESETZGE3UNG UND RECHTSGELEHRSAMXEEIT, cited in HEALER, op. cit. supra note 175, at
103-06.
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tain forms 'de verbo in verbumn,' which must be made probable by a 'fore-
oath,' complaint-witnesses, the exhibition of the wound, or other visible
confirmation. '215 The fore-oath was a preliminary oath by which the plaintiff
evidenced his good faith; thereafter he asserted his claim in set words, ad-
dressed to the defendant. 216 After defendant's denial, which was also formu-
lated in terms of a legal conclusion that the plaintiff had no claim, the assem-
bly proceeded to render "a proof-judgment, determining which of the parties
had the right to prove, what he was to prove, and how the proof was to be
made." 217 As in all Germanic laws, proof was "one-sided"; only one party was
admitted to proof. His proof decided the issue and dispensed with any ulti-
mate judgment. It was the judgment.
Apart from documents, the following forms of proof or trial were recog-
nized: witnesses; the party's oath, with or without fellow-swearers; the or-
deal; and battle.218 The oath played a role in several of them. In some it was
not an oath as to the truth of facts within the declarants' knowledge. In others
the "truth" attested to was a borderline concept between truth as an expres-
sion of social power and truth as accordance with objective reality.
Trial by witnesses "appears to have been one of the oldest kinds of 'one-
sided' proof. There was no testing by cross-examination; the operative thing
was the oath itself, and not the probative quality of what was said, or its per-
suasion on a judge's mind. '219 The function of the oath was to provide a stan-
dard form for executing the magic ritual, which was believed to produce a
just result. Therefore, observance of the ritual, rather than truthfulness of the
allegation, was of the utmost importance. "Any stumbling or stammering, any
variation from what has been ordained as to gesture or bodily position, is
fatal; the oath is then said to have 'burst,' and the proving party has lost his
cause." 220 In the twelfth century such elaborate forms of asseveration had
been devised that, rather than attempt them, men preferred to take their
chances with the hot iron.221 Among the witnesses produced by the parties.
only one swore to something approximating an allegation of fact-actually,
a legal conclusion. The others swore that the oath thus taken was "clean and
215. 1 THAYER 8-9.
216. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13
(1952) [hereinafter cited as MILLAR].
217. MILLAR 12-13.
218. There was no technical "trial" in a modern sense. The terms used to describe
the event are probatio, purgatio, defensio, and only seldom, if ever, in the earlier period,
triatio. 1 THAYER 16.
219. 1 THAYER 17.
Counter-witnesses could be produced if there was suspicion of falsehood, but the issue
between the opposing witnesses was decided by battle. 1 THAYER 17-18. For a similar
Frankish procedure, see CAPITULARE PRxmum LUDOVICI Pn (819), cited in ibid.
220. MILLAR 14.




free from falsity."222 The number of supporting witnesses seems to have been
decisive, as demonstrated by the fact that the court would adjourn in order
to afford either party an opportunity to increase the number.
22 3
In "trial by oath" the case turned on the defendant's oath which he gave
with fellow-swearers (probably his kinsmen). As among all other Germanic
peoples, these declarants were not true witnesses but compurgators, although
they were constantly called by the ambiguous name testis.22 4 While the re-
quired number of compurgators could be as high as three hundred persons,
a foreigner might, according to certain customs, substitute for compurgators
his own oath taken in the six nearest churches, that is, six times.2 25 Clearly,
the magic of the oath lay in its sheer external force, determined by the num-
ber of swearers or repetitions. This form of trial-the right to purge oneself
conclusively by oath-was regarded as a precious privilege.2 2 6 Known as
"wager of law" it is probably related to the Roman "sacrantentum." Since it
was deemed based upon "un positiVe ley,"227 this system withstood all chal-
lenges that the defendant might swear falsely. In 1833 it was finally abolished
by Parliament.
2 8
According to the dominant view, proof by witnesses or by oath at this
early period was actually an ordeal. 229 However, this interpretation may be
incorrect, if ordeal is equated with divine judgment. For belief in self-opera-
tive magic of the oath is acknowledged to have preceded belief in divine
intervention. Thus, it is quite possible that the oath functioned autonomous-
ly, without the gods' assistance. And the witnesses are believed to have func-
tioned as instruments of magic. At a more advanced period, when the ordeal
was undoubtedly conceived of as a divine judgment, the oath often served
as an alternative to, or a supplement of, the ordeal. To the extent that the
oath eventually was predicated upon God's judgment it may loosely be referred
to as an ordeal. However, even then it remained distinctive, for the oath itself
rather than divine intervention decided the issue at bar. Perhaps it was due
to this independence that the oath was regarded as a more "rational" means
of proof than the ordeal. In England as well as on the Continent, the oath was
substituted for the ordeal after the ban on the latter by the Fourth Lateran
Council in 1215.230
222. 1 THAYER 19.
223. 1 THAYER 22.
224. 1 THAYER 25.
225. 1 THAYER 28.
226. See Slade's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Q.B. 1602). (The action
on the case "takes away the defendant's benefit of wager of law, and so bereaves him
of the benefit which the law gives him, which is his birthright.")
227. See the opinion of Ayshton, J., in Y.B. 33 Hen. 7, f. 7, pl. 23 (1454-1455);
Company of Glaziers Case, Anon., 2 Salk. 682, 91 Eng. Rep. 580 (K.B. 1699), 31.
228. Statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 13 (1833).
229. See, e.g., MILLAR 14.
230. 1 THAYER 39.
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Trial by battle, a Norman import, appears (in combination with the oath)
as an ultima. ratio of proof for the first time in the case of Bishop Wzdfstan
v. Abbot Walter, in 1077, of which it was reported: "Thereof there are law-
ful witnesses . . . who saw and heard this, ready to prove it by oath and
battle." 231 Before the battle the champions usually swore to the truth of their
allegations which were based on their own personal knowledge or that of their
fathers.23 2 In this context, the "power" of truth was established by arms and
oath magic. This combination clearly points to the social rather than cognitive
character of the "truth" in issue, for trial by battle has been said not to have
been an ordeal at all since it had aspects other than an appeal to Heaven.
2 33
The Jury Oath
The Ngrmans had brought to England the inquisition in matters of public
administration. This investigation consisted of summoning, by public author-
ity, a number of likely people who might be expected to tell the truth and
in examining them under oath as to matters that occurred in the vicinity. This
process gave birth to the jury system. The original nature of the jury insti-
tution is rooted in proof by witnesses. As stated by Brunner, "[T]he history
of juries should record the remarkable fact that the trial jury [Beweisfry-
jury of proof] is accompanied by remnants of an obsolete procedure by wit-
nesses, while alongside it proof by compurgators is not only preserved with
undiminished strength but has also partly penetrated the area of proof by wit-
nesses."23 4 Jury proof was but a special type of proof. "Lex" in the Germanic
law was not "law" (as in the Roman "legis actiones") but a mode of trial
or "proof." There are the "lex apparens (manifesta)" which was the ordeal,
the "lex disraisinae" which was the oath of purgation, the "lex probabilis"
which was a collective name for miscellaneous types of proof, and the "lex
recordationis," proof by select witnesses concerning transactions which had
taken place in their presence in court. Proof by the "lex inquisitionis" was
an addition to this group.235 Trial by jury (per legem terrae) emerged as
one of these prevailing formal and mechanical "trials." Thayer compared all
these "trials" to a prize-fight, in which the issue was decided by a struggle.
That comparison surely holds for the various ordeals:
[T]he accused party "tried" his own case by undergoing the given re-
quirement as to hot iron, or water, or the crumb. So of the oath; the
question, both law and fact, was "tried" merely by the oath, with or with-
out fellow-swearers. The old "trial by witnesses" was a testing of the
question in like manner by their mere oath. So a record was said to "try"
231. 1 THAYa 40.
232. 1 THAYER 43.
233. See 1 THAYER 39. The last appearance of this institution was in 1815. See Ash-
ford v. Thornston, 1 B. & Ald. 405, 106 Eng. Rep. 149 (K.B. 1818). It was abolished in
1819 by statute. Act to Abolish . . . Wager of Battle, 1819, 59 Geo. 3, c. 46.
234. BRUNNER, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER SCHWURGERICHTE 195 (1872).
235. Id. at 177-89.
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itself. And so when out of the midst of these methods first came the trial
by jury, it was the jury's oath, or rather their verdict, that "tried" the
case.
2 36
The jury developed from "a corporate association of witnesses." 237  The
jury oath constituted it the "oath community" reminiscent of the community
of the Germanic compurgators who swore together as a unit "with total
mouth." As a method of proof, the jury was preferred to the duel because
"by as much as the testimony of several credible witnesses outweighs in courts
that of a single one, by so much is this process more equitable than the duel.
For while the duel goes upon the testimony of one sworn person, this insti-
tution requires the oaths of at least twelve lawful men. '238 It was the power
of the oath which decided the case and the number of jurors, like the number
of compurgators, served to increase the force of the oath, and enhanced its
magical or social rather than cognitive function.
It is difficult to trace the process of thought which led to separation of the
jury verdict from the jury oath or to determine the exact time in history
when the members of the jury began to function as judges who reach a de-
cision on the basis of evidence presented during trial. In all probability this
development was similar to that which resulted in the transformation of com-
purgators into witnesses deposing as to facts within their knowledge, upon
oath de veritate dicenda rather than de credibilitate. There is room for doubt
that this latter process of development has ever been completed, for even
today fact and legal conclusion cannot be neatly severed. Therefore it may be
argued that an oath cannot ever be a pure oath de veritate.
239
The Accused's Oath: Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
It is perhaps due to the inherent inadequacy of fact finding by any rational
process of legal proof, added to inertia and atavism, that symbolical fact find-
ing by prescribed forms or rituals has been preserved long after its irration-
ality had been recognized. Perhaps also these are the reasons that, in Eng-
land, trial by battle survived until 1815 and wager of law was not abolished
until 1833. However, there seem to be other more practical reasons for the
survival of these primitive procedures. They were often advantageous to de-
fendants and, accordingly, were prized as privileges, indeed, as civil liberties.
In civil wager of law or criminal purgation, the defendant could avoid all
liability merely by taking an oath, and as stated in Slade's Case, "men's
consciences grew so large that the respect of their private advantage rather
induces men . . .to perjury. '240 Also, punishment of perjury was, for a long
236. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 HIAv. L. REV. 147, 156-57 (1890).
237. BRUNNER, op. cit. supra note 234, at 279.
238. GLANVILL, DE LEGiBus ET CONSUETUDNIBus REGNI ANGLVE bk. 2, ch. 7, at 63
(Woodbine ed. 1932), translated in 1 THAYER 42 n.1.
239. See Silving, Law and Fact in the Light of the Pure Theory of Law, in INTER-
PRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHiLosoPHiEs 642 (Sayre ed. 1947).
240. 4 Co. Rep. 92b, 95a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1078 (Q.B. 1602).
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time, relegated to divine retribution. Many a defendant deeply resented any
attempt to deprive him of his "birthright" (to wage his law or purge him-
self) by submitting him to a more rational method of proof. The right to
secure acquittal in a criminal case by taking an oath of purgation was asserted
against attempts of ecclesiastical authority to force the accused to state the
truth by compelling him to take the canon law oath de veritate dicenda. That
oath had been introduced as part of the procedure ex officio (which replaced
the adversary, party dominated, old Germanic procedure) and originally was
aimed at ascertaining substantive truth by the somewhat more rational method
of questioning. It was the introduction of the oath de veritate dicenda which
seems to have created the controversy from which our privilege against self-
incrimination resulted.
Mary Hume Maguire has shown that, contrary to Wigmore's assertion,
jurisdictional jealousy between temporal and ecclesiastical courts was not the
only root from which the privilege developed. 241 She found that opposition
to the oath ex officio as "repugnant to the ancient customs of our Realm"
and contrary to the spirit of the common law was an even stronger factor in
the development. The common lawyers objected to initiating proceedings by
an e.r officio oath instead of by the conventional methods of accusation and
denunciation. 242 They defended the ancient Germanic adversary procedure and
the right to defend oneself by oath of purgation, characteristic of that proce-
dure, against the inquisitorial procedure and the oath de veritate dicenda
incident thereto.243 This, indeed, appears from a proper reading of the maxim:
241. Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio As Adininis-
tered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, in EssAys IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL
THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD MCIL WAIX 199 (1936).
242. They objected to the official rather than private form of proceedings, as well as
to the "fishing interrogatories viva voce." Id. at 203, 208.
243. This is Lilburne's account of the oath he was asked to take in the Star Chamber:
* . .and then he bid me pull off my glove, and lay my hand upon the book. What
to do, sir? said I. You must swear, said he. To what? "That you shall make true
answer to all things that are asked you." Must I so, sir? but before I swear, I
will know to what I must swear .... And withal I perceived the oath to be an
oath of inquiry; and for the lawfulness of which oath, I have no warrant; and
upon these grounds I did and do still refuse the oath.
Trial of John Lilburn, 3 State Trials 1315, 1320-21 (G.B. Star Ch. 1637). The court
order also stated that Lilburne and Wharton "denied to take an oath to make answer to
Interrogatories." Id. at 1323. The clearest expression of Lilburne's position is contained
in the following colloquy:
Then said the Lord-Keeper, Thou art a mad fellow, seeing things are thus, that
thou wilt not take thine Oath, and answer truly.
My honourable lord, I have declared unto you the real truth; but for the oath,
it is an oath of inquiry, and of the same nature as the High-Commission Oath;
which oath I know to be unlawful; and withal I find no warrant in the Word of
God for an oath of inquiry, and it ought to be the director of me in all things that
I do: and therefore, my lords, at no hand, I dare not take the oath. (When I
named the Word of God, the court began to laugh, as though they had nothing
1366 [Vol. 68:1329
THE OATH
"Licet nenzo tenetur seipsum prodere, tamen proditus per famam tenetur
seipsum ostendere utrum possit suam innocentian ostendere et seipsum pur-
gare." Wigmore translated the sentence as: "Though no one is bound to be-
come his own accuser, yet when once a man has been accused (pointed at as
guilty) by general report, he is bound to show whether he can prove his in-
nocence and to vindicate himself. '244 In this translation the decisive term
"licet" is omitted and "ostendere" is erroneously translated as "prove." The
following translation comes closer to the original: "No one is bound to inform
against himself (literally, produce himself) ; but, when exposed by public re-
pute (fana), he is held (tenetur) and permitted (licet) to show, if he can,
his innocence and purge himself. ' 245 Notice that there is no mention in the
maxim of a confession or admission. The only possibility is a "showing" of
"innocence." This, indeed, was the function of the conclusive oath of purga-
tion, the "oath of innocence," a corollary of wager of law. It was accorded
to the accused by both the Germanic and the canon law, as his "right and
duty, against an accusation, to show his innocence by oath of purgation [with
compurgators]."246 Obviously, the maxim modified Thomas Aquinas' argu-
ment which had supplied the justification for the oath de veritate dicenda of
the canon law inquisitorial procedure, that if there had been infamia or pro-
batio senziplena, the suspect-when asked to confess-must neither lie nor
conceal the truth. Significantly, even within the system of inquisitorial pro-
cedure at canon law no one was ever required to inform against himself-
"prodere seipsum." That procedure merely demanded of the proditus (ac-
cused) that he confess. Wigmore's version of the maxim would be but a re-
statement of the inquisitorial rule, except that he did not mention confession
to do with it) My lords (said Mr. Goad) he told me yesterday, he durst not
take the oath, though he suffered death for the refusal of it. And with that my
Lord Privy-Seal spoke: Will you (said he) take your oath, that that which you
have said is true? My lord (said I) I am but a young man, and do not well know
what belongs to the nature of an oath, (but that which I have said, is a real truth)
but thus much; by God's appointment, I know an. oath ought to be the end of all
controversy and strife, Heb. 6. 16. and if it ntight be so i this my present cause,
I would safely take my oath, that what I have said is true.
Id. at 1325. (Emphasis added.) Obviously, Lilburne offered to take the conclusive "oath
of purgation," his "birthright" under the common law, the corollary of "wager of law,"
at issue in the Slade's Case. After being punished for contempt, Lilburne stated that he
was condemned "because I would not accuse myself." Id. at 1329. Notice also that Lil-
burne used the old theological argument against the oath, that it violates man's right of
self-preservation: "Withal, this Oath is against the very law of nature; for nature is al-
ways a preserver of itself, and not a destroyer ... ." Id. at 1332.
244. Wigmore, Nenso Tenetur Seipsnum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REv. 71, 83 n.2 (1892).
245. "Ostendere" is not equivalent to "probare." The passage does not indicate that
the suspect must "prove" anything. He "shows" his innocence by merely taking the oath.
This is not "proof" in a technical sense. Also "tenwtur" has a double meaning; it may
mean "he is bound," but also "he is held (deemed, believed)."
246. See 4 HINSCHIUS, SYSTEM DES KATHOLISCHEN ICRCHENRECHTS MIT BESONDERER
Ri0cxsiCHT AUF DEUTSCHLAND 840 (1888).
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-the very object of inquisition. In the absence of any reference to confession
and in the light of the emphasis placed upon the "showing of innocence," the
meaning of the maxim is plain: it grants to the suspect exemption from the
oath de veritate dicenda and confers upon him the right and duty of purging
himself conclusively by taking the ancient Germano-canonic "oath of purga-
tion." Obviously the maxim was so understood by "Freeborne John" Lii-
burne, who defied the Council of the Star Chamber, and secured the celebrated
granting of the self-incrimination privilege.
The English prohibition against administering the oath de veritate dicenda
to an accused was a modern view of the subject, upon which the enlightened
minds of continental Europe looked with admiration and envy.247 Many be-
lieve that civil law countries simply adopted the English prohibition. Differ-
ences in the justification and scope of the continental and English rules as
well as a long history of opposition to the oath in continental Europe render
this temptingly simple explanation rather doubtful. In any event, the popular-
ity of the English rule in civil law countries did not guarantee its survival in
England or the United States. It was repealed in England in 1898,248 and
defendants were first granted the "privilege" of giving evidence sworn to be
true. In the United States the oath of an accused had been accepted earlier. 21 9
Only Georgia has, until the present time, withstood all temptations of per-
mitting the accused to be sworn. 2 50 Indeed, unlike civil law countries and the
remaining American states, Georgia does not subject the accused to any in-
quisitorial questioning at all, but instead affords him an opportunity to make
"just such statement as he sees fit" 251-a statement which the jury is free to
believe in preference to the sworn statement of witnesses. Clearly, the Georgia
247. See 2 G.ARAuD 49 (1909); Pfenninger, Die Wahrheitspflicht des Beschuldigten
im schweizerschen Strafverfahren, 53 ScHwEizFRiscHE JURISTEX-ZEITUNG 129, 130
(1957). See note 372 infra.
248. lCriminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36 § 1 (e).
249. As stated by Thayer, A Chapter of Legal History of Massachusetts, in LEGAL
EssAYs 310, 323-24 (1908), "This remarkable inroad upon the common law had been
first made in Maine by a statute of 1864, c. 280; and it has long been the law in most
of our States. It was introduced in the Federal Jurisdiction by a statute of March 16,
1878." The latter statute is Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30.
250. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (1938), which reads as follows:
In all criminal trials, the prisoner shall have the right to make to the court and
jury such statement in the case as he may deem proper in his defense. It shall not
be under oath, and shall have such force only as the jury may think right to give
it. They may believe it in preference to the sworn testimony in the case. The
prisoner shall not be compelled to answer any questions on cross-examination,
should he think proper to decline to answer.
251. See Prater v. State, 160 Ga. 138, 143-45, 127 S.E. 296, 298-99 (1925), reversing
a homicide conviction on the ground that the trial judge had prevented the accused from
making a statement pertaining to what happened after the shooting and in incorrectly
instructing the jury on the evidentiary value of defendant's unsworn statement. The Court
held that the rules of evidence as to relevancy and materiality of testimony do not apply
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rule is closer to the privilege given Lilburne, than are the rules prevailing in
other jurisdictions of the United States and in England.
to the defendant's statement, since such statement is not evidence. The court elaborated
thus on the value of defendant's statement:
To show that this court has never treated the statement of a defendant as evi-
dence, it has been held times almost numberless that a theory arising only from
the defendant's statement need not be presented to the jury, nor need the jury be
instructed as to the law applicable to the theory presented in the statement, in the
absence of a written request for such instruction. The statement not under oath
"shall have such force only as the jury may think right to give it." But it is to
be, not what may be relevant or material according to the strict rules of law, but
"such statement in the case as he [the defendant] may deem proper in his defense."
The defendant is not subject to cross-examination upon the statement; and yet, al-
though the statement is in a sense outlawed as evidence, and the jury may dis-
believe a part and believe another part or disbelieve it in toto, and though it is
not evidence, the jury "may believe it in preference to the sworn testimony in the
case." The last consideration certainly places the statement above all classification
of evidence, if the jury see proper to believe it. The privilege of making this state-
ment has existed in this State for many years, and the nature of the statement of
the defendant in a criminal case has frequently been considered. The court may
prevent repetition of the same statement, or debar all circumstances wholly discon-
nected in fact with the facts upon which the defendant bases his defense. But the
statement of the defendant is not to be curtailed by either ruling or interruption
merely because the facts stated by the defendant, and which constitute a part of
his narrative of his connection with the case, may under the rules of evidence be
irrelevant and do not present in law a valid defense. .. . [T]he defendant is not
confined to matters which are legally pertinent to the issue.
It matters not that it appears anomalous that a defendant can tate that which
is irrelevant and that which in law can offer him no just ground of defense. Facts
and circumstances wholly disconnected from any legal defense, and which might
appeal merely to the sympathy of the jury and offer no reason for an acquittal,
might cause a defendant indicted for murder to be recommended to life imprison-
ment rather than be subjected to capital punishment.... Or in case of doubt as to
the credibility of the State's testimony,--the jury having no less the right to con-
sider the appearance and credibility of the defendant than the appearance of the
witnesses against him,-the statement of the defendant, his manner of stating it, and
nesses against him,--the statement of the defendant, his manner of stating it, and
the apparent candor of the reasons he might present as to the motives which in-
fluenced the act, even though he may overlook or omit any reference to the main
charge, and though some of his statements under the rules of evidence might be
objectionable as conclusions or hearsay, the statement allowed might create and
justify such reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt as would authorize an acquit-
tal.
It is interesting to note that the right to make such statement is one personal to the de-
fendant. Counsel may make suggestions to the defendant, but only by the permission of
the court and at the risk of "greatly disparaging, if not altogether discrediting, every
material fact that the defendant may have stated."
The Board of Governors of the Georgia Bar Association last December called for an
amendment of the Georgia rule "to provide that a defendant shall be entitled to testify
in his own behalf, provided that ... the accused [be permitted] to elect to make a sworn
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The Party Oath in Civil Cases
Wager of law in the common law corresponds to the conclusive party oath
which has been preserved until today in several civil law countries. It implies
that he is different from an ordinary witness, so that his "testimonial" oath
is not received. Consistently, testimony of a party was barred at common law,
although the rationale advanced for the rule was that a party was disqualified
as an "interested witness." This reason, in a way assimilating a party to a
witness, forecast a change of policy. The disqualification, criticized by Bent-
ham, was abolished in England in 1851,252 less than twenty years after repeal
of wager of law. It was thereafter gradually repealed in the United States,
jurisdiction by jurisdiction.2 5 3 Subsequently, the English institution of party
testimony and the testimonial oath of a party-as distinct from the conclusive
party oath-was imitated in Austria, and under her leadership, in other civil
law countries.
Criticism and Reform Projects
The most significant English project for the reform of oath legislation was
that advanced by Bentham.2 5 4 Rather paradoxically, while theological and
metaphysical writers often attacked the oath on utilitarian grounds, Bentham,
the foremost utilitarian, based his argument against the oath mainly on theo-
logical grounds. He stressed the logical inconsistency of the religious oath
with the notion of an almighty God, the profanity of invoking the name of
God in matters of a shilling or a half-penny, 255 and the superfluity of secular
perjury sanctions when divine punishment is expected.25 6 Citing the Bible,
25 7
he suggested that the oath be abolished and that all mendacity "uttered upon
a legal occasion, for a legal purpose" be punished "according to the nature
of the mischief."
258
or unsworn statement, but the rules to apply as to other witnesses if he elects to make a
sworn statement." Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Governors, 21 GA. B.J. 397
(1959).
252. Evidence Act, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 99, as amended, Evidence Further Amend-
ment Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 68.
253. Massachusetts followed closely the English Amendment, see Practice Act of
1851, Mass. Acts & Resolves 1851, ch. 233; Thayer, supra note 249, at 323. For statutes
permitting the accused to testify under oath in his own case, see 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 488 n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
254. BENTHAM, "SWEAR NOT AT ALL"I-oNTAINING AN EXPOSURE OF THE NEEDLESS-
NESS AND M'ISCHIEVOUSNESS, AS WELL As ANTICHRISTIANITY OF THE CEREMONY OF AN
OATH (1817); 1 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 366-420 (1827).
255. BENTHAM, "SWEAR NOT AT ALL" 18 (1817).
256. Id. at 5.
257. Matthew 5:34.
258. 1 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 366-67 (1827). In support of
his thesis, Bentham cited two hypothetical situations: that of a man by whose false testi-
mony his father had been put to death, and that of a man by whose false testimony a




Abolition of the oath has been advocated in the United States particularly
on the ground that it is incompatible with freedom of thought and religion,259
as well as because of its ritualistic, superstitious nature. Some critics have
said that since no distinction is presently made between an affirmation and
an oath, the oath has become meaningless. 260 On the other hand, some writers
have argued that the affirmation is in effect an oath.
261
The Religious Issue
Primitive belief in the magical power of the oath could not sustain modern
use of the oath. A new rationale was necessary. To replace the old "objective
theory," according to which the oath was viewed as an independent instru-
ment of magic, modern writers advanced the so-called "subjective theory of
the oath." 262 Greenleaf advocated the following Copernican turn: "The design
of the oath is not to call the attention of God to man; but the attention of
man to God ;--not to call on Him to punish the wrong-doer; but on man to
remember that He will. '263 Wigmore formulated this interpretation in some-
what more explicit terms: "This being the function of the oath, it must in-'
volve the calling to mind of some superhuman moral retribution which accord-
ing to the witness' belief is calculated to induce him to refrain from false
statements and thus to avoid retribution. ' '26' The turn of thought from the
objective to the subjective level amounts to the fact that while the state itself
has ceased to countenance the magic operation of the oath and is fully aware
of its illogical nature, it, nevertheless, utilizes the fallacious belief of its citizens
as a medium of legal control.
By way of contrast, the earlier common law hesitated to employ any de-
ception in administering the oath. The state, of course, accepted the objective
theory-that the oath was an external instrument of magic. And, to be ad-
mitted to oath, an individual had to share this view. Thus, nonbelievers were
prevented from deceiving the state-taking the oath while not accepting its
supernatural significance. Eventually, however, politics determined a change
of approach. Concerned about the interferences with "trade" that barring in-
fidels from the oath and hence from testifying would bring about, commerce-
minded England abandoned Coke's view of the oath as a Christian preroga-
tive. In the leading case of Omychund v. Barker,265 the Chief Baron said:
"Upon the whole, not to admit these witnesses (Gentous) would be destruc-
259. See White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and their Effect upon the Competency
of Witnesses, 57 As. L. R.aisrm 373, 429 (1903).
260. id. at 425-26.
261. E.g., Reilly, Judicial Oaths, 1 JuRIcAL Soc'Y PApERs 435, 439, 443-46 (1858)
(citing the proposal of the Indian Land Commissioners [First Report 1856] to dispense
with all oaths).
262. See 6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1816, at 284-85 (3d ed. 1940).
263. 1 GENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 364a, at 504 (16th ed. 1899).
264. 6 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1816, at 285-86 (3d ed. 1940). (Emphasis added.)
265. 1 Atk. 19, 21, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 ('Ch. 1744).
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tive of trade, and subversive of justice, and attended with innumerable in-
conveniences.1 266 Lord Chief Justice Willes, rejecting significant authority,
stressed that "they lived in popish times, when no other trade was carried on
except the trade of religion," and expressed the hope that "such times will
never come again."
267
Even in the face of the needs of expanding trade, however, the courts in
Omychund v. Barker and subsequent cases insisted on at least a modicum of
common belief between the state and the oath taker: the declarant must be-
lieve in a Supreme Being who will punish him if he speaks falsely. A con-
troversy, "as foolish as it was needless, '268 as to whether it is necessary for
the witness to believe in Divine punishment in an after-life or whether it is
sufficient if he believes that God will punish him in this life,2 6 9 was resolved
in favor of the latter solution.M70 In time provision was made for persons who
objected to the oath on religious grounds. Focus then shifted to the problem
of the witness who is a nonbeliever.
271
It was no longer "essential to the competency of a witness that he shall
know where he will go after death."272 However, although this lack of faith
would not disqualify him as a witness, it "might affect his credit with the
jury. 2 73 Once the validity of a nonbeliever's oath was admitted,2 74 the ques-
tion arose as to the weight that should be given to his sworn testimony as
well as to the proper method of testing his belief for purposes of challenging
credibility. Reasonable doubts also arose as to the credibility of a nonbelieving
witness who did not avail himself of the opportunity to affirm rather than to
invoke God. But the methods of challenging a witness' belief cut deeply into
constitutional rights, particularly in the United States.2 7 5
Undoubtedly, "personal scrutiny" into the state of man's "faith and con-
science" is "contrary to the spirit of our institutions." 276 Nonetheless, scrutiny
of this nature has been barred only as to self-disclosure, and not disclosure
by "other means than examination upon the stand."2 77 As increasing protec-
266. Id. at 44, 26 Eng. Rep. at 30.
267. Ibid.
268. See White, supra note 259, at 391.
269. See cases cited in id. at 392 nn.36 & 37.
270. See 6 WIsMoRE, EvIDmcE § 1817, at 288-89 (3d ed. 1940).
271. See White, supra note 259, at 396-414. As regards those who have conscientious
scruples against administering the oath, see id. at 443-44.
272. Gantz v. State, 18 Ga. App. 154, 88 S.E. 993, 994 (1916), cited in Gillars v.
United States, 182 F2d 962, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
273. Ibid.
274. 'See Oaths Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 46, § 3; UNImoFRm DRAFT EVIDENCE ACT
§ 17 (1938) ; 6 WiGmom, EVIDENCE § 1828, at 314 (3d ed. 1940) (collecting the statutes
dealing with this problem).
275. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1820, at 299-301 (3d ed. 1.940).
276. See Free v. Buckingham, 59 N.H. 219, 225 (1879).
277. Commonwealth v. Smith, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 516 (1854) ; 8 WIXGORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2213, at 162 (3d ed. 1940).
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tion is given to man's right of privacy, the problem of whether his faith should
be opened to scrutiny, whatever the sources of information utilized, becomes
more acute. Requiring that a man support his objection to being sworn by
disclosing "either that he has no religious belief or that the taking of an oath
is contrary to his religious belief"278 or even placing him in a situation where
he must admit by implication that he holds either a nonconformist belief or
no belief at all 270 seems an unwarranted invasion of his conscience. Finally,
there is the question of whether any attempt to define other people's beliefs
is compatible with the prevailing conception of religion as an area of thought
in which doubt is still possible.
280
The Children's Oath
Placing children under oath raises the most serious problems of common
law oath administration. In civil law countries children are, for their protec-
tion, immune from oath. Indeed, a determined effort is made to protect chil-
dren from the experience even of unsworn testimony in court.28 1 Of course,
in a criminal case the strong interest of the accused must be weighed against
the need for protecting the child from an undesirable experience.2 8 2 Yet a
cursory perusal of the history of the children's oath in this country should
suffice to show the unfortunate implications of admitting children to oath in
order to protect the accused. Perhaps no better demonstration may be offered
than a recital of one colloquy between a judge and a child witness, a conver-
sation conducted for the purpose of determining the child's "moral and re-
ligious sensibility," 283 on which often depends its capacity to take the oath
and to testify.
278. See The Oaths Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 46; Moore, The Passing of the
Oath, 37 Am. L. REv. 554, 559 (1903).
279. Lamont refused to take a religious oath on the ground that the institution of an
oath requires an at least implied or express declaration of faith or of atheism. See THE
LAMONT CASE, HISTORY OF A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 20-21 (Wittenberg ed.
1957).
280. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944) ; Silving, The Unknown
and the Unknowable in Law, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 352, 366-74 (1947).
281. Note particularly the Israeli Law Amending the Law of Evidence (Protection
of Children), Sefer Chukim 184, para. 96 (1955).
282. In Judgment of Aug. 30, 1951, Bundesgerichtshof (II. Ferienstrafsenat), 1 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen 342 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), the German
Bundesgerichtshof resolved such conflict in favor of the accused's right to have an adverse
witness testify in open court.
283. More recently, see State v. Merritt, 236 N.C. 363, 364, 72 S.E.2d 754, 755
(1952), citing State v. Edwards, 79 N.C. 648 (1878). In the latter case, the witness, a six
and a half year old daughter of the victim of murder, "gave the ordinary answers to the
ordinary questions put in such cases,--such as that God made her, that He would punish
her if she told a falsehood, that she was sworn to tell the truth and would be punished
if she did not do so." Relying on this precedent, the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Merritt, decided in the year 1952, upheld a conviction based on testimony of a child "4
years, 10 months and 5 days of age," after pointing out that the record revealed, among
other things, "her concept of Deity and responsibility for telling the truth."
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The child was six years of age. She was asked the following questions,
among others, and gave the following answers:
By the court: Q. "What is your name?" A. "Olie Leverett." Q. "Who
made you-do you know?" A. "No, sir." Q. "Don't you know God made
you?" A. "Yes, sir." Q. "Did you never hear about that?" A. "No, sir."
Q. "Did you never hear about the old bad man ?" A. "No, sir." Q. "That
gets bad children and burns them up?" A. "Yes, sir." Q. "Did you never
hear about that?" A. "Yes, sir." Q. "When they tell lies?" A. "Yes, sir."
Q. "Did you never hear about people going to the penitentiary or to jail
for telling lies ?" A. "No, sir." Q. "Don't you know that, if you were to
tell a lie, a man were hung on your evidence, that you would be hung,
too ?" A. "Yes, sir. ' 284
To be sure, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the child's sworn testimony was improperly admitted since she did not
sufficiently understand the obligation of an oath,285 and had no more than "the
slightest conception of any future, much less of any future punishment for
perjury or other bad conduct in this life." Yet hope was expressed that "on
a second trial, as she advances in age and moral training, she may better
understand these obligations and penalties, and may become competent." Of
course, this took place in 1885, but later cases show little more refinement in test-
ing children's moral and religious competency to be sworn. Children have
been asked, "Do you expect to live forever ?' 286 "Where is hell?"287 and
similar questions apt to baffle even a theologian. The absurdity of such
methods of determining a child's credibility in the light of modern psychologi-
cal knowledge should be apparent.288 Even when children are admitted to
oath after "persistent questioning" aimed at discovering whether they appre-
ciate the obligation to tell the truth when under oath,28 9 it would seem that
psychologically more sophisticated methods could produce a more effective
inducement to veracity and could, at the same time, minimize inhibitions about
the testimony to be secured.2 90
284. Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. 76, 78 (1885).
285. No full report is published and the following quotations are from the headnotes
of the case.
286. See State v. Cracker, 65 N.J.L. 410, 412, 47 Atl. 643, 644 (tCt. Q. Sess. 1900).
287. See 6 WiGmomE, EvmiENcE § 1821, at 305 n.7 (3d ed. 1940).
288. See Woolf, The Child's Moral Developmenwt, in SEARCHLIGHTS oN DELINQUENCY
263 (Eissler ed. 1949). With regard to lying in sex matters and lying out of spite, see
id. at 267-69.
289. A ten year old girl was permitted to be sworn in Doran v. United States, 205
F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953). Although she did not know
"what it meant to tell the truth or to swear to tell the truth nor did she know what
would happen to a person who swore to tell the truth but told a 'story' instead," the oath
was administered to her because "persistent questioning by the trial judge elicited the
information that she did know what it was to tell a story; that she must not tell a story
if she swore to tell the truth. . ....
290. In such cases it seems desirable to secure the assistance of experts in child
psychology. Compare the Israeli law, cited note 281 supra.
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A growing realization of the futility, unreality and psychological cost of
administering oaths to children has led some jurisdictions to limit the prac-
tice. For example, New York early permitted judges to forego putting chil-
dren on oath in criminal cases. 2 91 No such discretion has been accorded in
civil cases,2 2 notwithstanding the fact that protection of a party in a civil
case against false testimony is undoubtedly less important than that of an
accused in a criminal case. In other jurisdictions, in civil as well as in criminal
cases, only an interested party's failure to object will cure the defect of an
omission to put a child witness under oath.
293
It would seem consistent with the practice of permitting children to be
sworn that they also be accorded the privilege of affirming instead of swear-
ing-a privilege implicit in freedom of conscience. But in a recent New Jer-
sey case,29 4 the appellate court criticized the trial judge for accepting a child's
"affirmation." Apparently, that affirmation lacked the solemnity ordinarily
required, and the child did not claim the privilege to affirm rather than
to swear.2 )5 Hence, the case can hardly be regarded as authority for denying
a child the right to affirm. In the absence of other precedent, the issue of a
child's right to affirm, in all its complexities, is still an unsettled question.
THE TRADITION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT THE OATH
There are three groups of legal systems in which the oath has either never
existed or has been wholly or to a very large extent abolished: the law of the
291. N.Y. CODE CRI. PROC. § 392, codifying N.Y. Sess. Laws 1892, ch. 279, permits
children "actually or apparently under the age of twelve years" to testify in special cases
without taking an oath, though such evidence is not sufficient to convict, unless cor-
roborated or supported.
292. The trial court must ascertain whether the child has sufficient capacity to com-
prehend the obligation of an oath, and, if so, must have him sworn. Unsworn testimony
of a child is inadmissible in a civil case. Napiearlski v. Pickering, 278 App. Div. 456, 106
N.Y.S.2d 28 (1951); Stoppick v. Goldstein, 174 App. Div. 306, 160 N.Y. Supp. 947
(1916).
"Where it appears probable that the unsworn testimony of an infant was given weight
in the determination below, the interests of justice require that such determination be set
aside and a new trial ordered." Clarke v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 9 Misc. 2d 342,
172 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1,957). Apparently, the belief prevails that the oath can cure
the inadequacy of such testimony.
293. See Pooley v. State, 116 Ind. App. 199, 62 N.E.2d 484 (1945) (6 year old child).
294. State v. Gambutti, 36 N.J. Super. 219, 115 A.2d 136 (App. Div. 1955).
295. After satisfying himself by the usual inquiry, that the child (8 years of age)
was competent to testify, the judge "obtained an agreement from her to tell the truth and
said: 'All right. I will let her testify on that affirmation.'" The child was then permitted
to testify without being sworn. The conviction was reversed on other grounds, but the
court set forth the principles controlling a child's testimony with a view to the forthcom-
ing new trial. Relying on King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 1.99, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (Cr. Cas.
1779), it said that if found competent, the child must be sworn in a criminal case. Of
course, this very reliance on ancient case law in a matter relating to credibility of a
child's testimony in our age sheds doubt on the use of common law methods where scien-
tific knowledge is available.
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area of Chinese political rule, the law of several Swiss cantons and the law
of some Slavic, presently Communist, countries. In spite of a great diversity
in rationale, one element is common to these systems-the lack of the oath. There
is either no ancient oath practice or a traditional philosophy which does not
favor the oath. In the absence of an ancient and favorable tradition, the oath
practice has been easily abandoned on rational grounds. Where, as in Poland, the
oath tradition was somewhat stronger than it was in other jurisdictions that
presently abjure the oath, substitutes have enjoyed a position somewhat com-
parable to that formerly occupied by the oath. The history of these countries
is helpful in evaluating contemporary arguments for the oath's abandonment.
The Oath in Slavic Ciulture
Ancient Russian practices indicate that the oath was not a favored institu-
tion. It first appears in Oleg's treaty with the Greeks in 912 A.D. to which
both parties swore adherence. 29 6 In addition, the first provision of Oleg's
document, one that dealt with procedures to be followed in the event of dis-
cord between the Greeks and the Russians,29 7 stated that if there were no
clear "traces" of a damaging event, a claimant was required to "swear accord-
ing to his faith." The oath thus appears to have been used as a secondary
method of proof limited to litigation with foreigners. In litigation between
Russians, the preferred method of proof was by clear traces such as wounds,
marks, possession of things belonging to another, and eye witnesses. 299 When
this kind of evidence was unavailable, arbitration was often employed to settle
differences.299
The oldest known Russian statute, Iaroslav's Pravda (the first issue of the
Russkaia Pravda, probably promulgated in 1020 A.D.), similarly provided for
an oath only in minor matters involving foreigners. 3° ° That oath was an or-
deal-like device that conclusively disposed of the issue in controversy. 0' The
third issue of the Russkaia Pravda (in the middle of the 12th century) made
wider use of the oath, and also introduced oath helpers ('porotniki or pomoch-
niki) familiar in the Germanic law of that era. The spontaneity of this parallel-
ism may well be doubted.30 2 In any event, oath helpers were admissible only in
296. 'See EWERS, DAS ALTEST REcHT DER RussEN IN SEINER GESCHICHTLICHEN




300. Thus, Article X provides that when "a man pushes another either from himself
or toward himself ... he must produce two eye witnesses (zidoka) or if he be a Vary-
ager or Kolbyag, upon oath" (to na roti). The Russian text is cited in EWERS 267.
Ewers explains this distinction between the treatment of Russians and of foreigners by
the fact that the foreigner who possessed no house or family in Russia could more easily
be offended secretly and be unable to produce witnesses. EwFas 277.
301. EWERS 339.
302. See 2 PRAVDA RuSSKAIA-KoiaiENTARII comments to art. 18, at 327-28 (Grekov
ed. 1947) for this parallelism. Doubt as to its spontaneity has been raised by SCHULTZ,
RusSISCHE RECHTSGESCHIcHTE 62-63 (1951).
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cases of murder. These early features-the oath's strictly subsidiary nature
and the limitations placed on its use-are peculiar to Russian law.
In subsequent legal sources the oath appeared in various forms,303 the pat-
terns of which resemble those of other cultures. Since Russia was engaged in
international trade relations, these patterns were probably imported from
abroad. From the beginning of the period of the absolute empire (Peter the
Great), foreign influences were no longer a matter of conjecture. Through
the medium of the Military Code (voinskii ustav) of 1716, the German in-
quisitorial procedure was adopted in the Collection of Laws (svod zakonov)
of 1832.304 In accordance with this system of formal proof, if the evidence
against the accused was not sufficient to support a conviction so that he was
"left in a state of suspicion," in cases of lesser consequence he could purge
himself by oath.305 The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1864, based on the
French Code d'instruction criminelle (1808), introduced the accusatorial sys-
tem and free evaluation of the evidence. As in the French pattern, witnesses
were sworn, and, in the Russian adaptation, the oath was administered by a
priest in court.30 6 In contrast, the Code of Civil procedure of the same year
did not adopt the French party oath.
30 7
When evaluating current Soviet rationales for repealing the oath in the
Soviet Republics, rationales that represent this repeal as a specifically Soviet
achievement attributable to a peculiarly Soviet conception of the system of
free evaluation of the evidence, it is well to remember that the oath never
became a focal point of procedure in Russian history as it did in the Ger-
manic procedure.
Polish law before the end of Polish independence (third partition in 1795)
shows several distinctive traits. In medieval history, the oath of the witness
was but a fortified oath of the party. No strict distinction was drawn between
testes qui fuerunt praesentes (eye witnesses) and testes qui sciunt (co-jura-
303. The Court Book of Pskov, PSKOVSKAIA SUDNAIA GRAMOTA, of controversial
date (the document itself bears the date 1397, but is believed to have been issued not
before 1462), permits the plaintiff to elect either taking the oath himself or offering it to
the defendant. Id. at 88-97. The Court Book of Novgorod, NOV-ORODSKAIA SUDNAIA
GRAMOTA, of about the middle of the 15th century requires the plaintiff to take an oath
that his accusation is well founded. Id. at 99. In the Court Book of Tzar Ivan III, of
1497, SUDE3NIK VELIKOVO KNIAZIA IOANNA VAssnimLVicHA, the oath is used only where
there is no other evidence or where a party contests the testimony of the other party's
witnesses. The defendant is given the choice of taking the oath or referring it to the
plaintiff. Id. at 132. In the Code of Tzar Alexey Michailovitch of 1649, ULOZHENIE
TSARIA ALEXEIA MIKHAILOVICHA, the significance of the oath as a means of proof is
reduced; here also it is used only where there is no other proof, and in matters of small
value the lot serves as a substitute for the oath. Id. at 149.
304. Id. at 197, 212-13.
305. Id. at 212-13. In major matters torture was used. Torture was formally abolished
in 1762 but was again used during the reigns of Catharina II and Paul. Alexander I
eliminated it entirely in 1801. See id. at 213.
306. Id. at 214.
307. Id. at 216.
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tors) ; in the event that the required number of the former could not be pro-
duced, they could be supplemented by witnesses of the latter type.308 The law
showed great concern for the purity of the oath and established qualifications
aimed at preventing perjury.30 9 Only persons who were "fidedigni, bonae
fainae, in honore suo non suspecti, homines probi" (trustworthy, of good
reputation, not suspected in their honor, decent men) were admitted to oath.
Thus a witness suspected of a defamatory crime or a party suspected of hav-
ing committed the act in issue were not allowed to swear. A provision of
Mazovian law permitted a person to take an evidentiary oath not more than
three times within one year, much as old Moscovite legislation limited oath
taking to three times within a person's life. The court or the opposing party
could release a party or his witness from taking the oath. No compulsion to
induce the oath was applied, except that in the case of the party oath, a party
who refused to take the oath would lose the case. A person who had no
facultas iurandi (oath capacity), for example, because he had been excom-
municated, could be heard by the judge without oath and his testimony could
be considered, although it was given sine huramento (without oath). This
feature is the most striking demonstration of the fact that the oath had no
deep roots in Polish legal history. This fact, in turn, is undoubtedly significant
in realistically evaluating the actual basis of the recent abolition of the oath
in Poland, however important the Soviet example may have been.
Swiss Cantons
In several Swiss cantons, the oath has disappeared. In Zurich, the leading
example, its use clearly ceased before the legislation of 1715 which formally
abandoned the institution in most cases.310 One writer attributes the develop-
ment in Zurich to the fact that the Roman law was never received there.31 '
As an added cause, he mentions the strict conception of the oath's sacredness
introduced by the Reformation, which considerably reduced the number of
oaths taken.
312
At the time of the Reformation, the judicial oath in Zurich existed only in
the form of the original Germanic oath of purgation. In the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries an oath was used in civil cases where other methods of
determining the issue were not available. In those instances, however, the oath
was far more than "evidence" in a strict sense, for it conclusively determined
the issue on a theory of an implied settlement.313 The testimonial oath was
administered to witnesses until about 1620. From 1620 to 1670, the records
308. See KUTRZEBA, DAWNE POLSKIE PRAWO SADOWE W ZAPYSiE 7 (2d ed. 1927).
309. The following account of Polish law of the late middle ages is based on Boaow-
SKI, PRZYSIEGA DOWODOWA W PROCESIN POLSKIM P6iXrEJSZEGO 9REDNIOWIECZA 18, 23-47
(1926).
310. SPoERRY 52-60.
311. OL.LI, STuDIN fmER DEN GERicHTLicHEN EID (1858).




make no reference to a witness taking an oath.314 Later records often evidence
a "real oath"-a religious oath-apparently contrasted with a secular oath.
In general, Zurich court records reflect an increasing reluctance to use the
oath. In the late seventeenth century, without the slightest evidence as to
cause, the oath simply disappeared from the scene.
Perhaps the oath never took roots in the native Zurich procedure to which
lay judges gave great weight. Lay judges would naturally have favored free
evaluation of the evidence and spontaneously rejected formal and binding
means of proof.315 This preference developed into a tradition. Thus, substan-
tial judicial opposition was evoked by a proposal to reintroduce the oath in
1844.310 Stress was laid on the fact that "this institution is totally foreign to
popular sentiment. 3 17 And it was argued that: "Yearly 2,000 civil cases are
decided without oath and we are none the worse because of it."'31
Swiss abandonment of the oath was undoubtedly motivated in part by re-
ligious considerations. But the oath was discredited far beyond the demands
of the prevailing theology. Saint Augustine and other Catholic theologians
had, in fact, approved of the oath. Yet, in the Catholic Canton of Zug, the
oath was almost never used after the middle of the eighteenth century. 319
Zwingli, the Reformation's Zurich leader, vigorously opposed the "pranks of
the Anabaptists" which severely condemned the oath.320 He took the position
that the oath was a command of neighborly love and a "Divine thing" 321 and
warned only against its abuse.322 Interestingly, the oath was preserved in the
precise area in which Zwingli and others thought it abusive, namely, as an
oath of office. Conversely it practically disappeared in the area on which these
reformers did not focus their attention, namely, as a judicial oath.323 In the
face of both Catholic and Reformation approval, a deeply rooted popular
tradition must have been at work to effect the oath's abolition.
314. SPOERRY 58-60.
315. See SPoERRY 72-73. For citation of Cantonal legislation giving the party oath
the effect of formal proof, see GULDENER, BEWEISWURDIGUNG UND BEWEISLAST NACH
SCHWEIZERISCHEM ZrLPvOZESSRECHT 3 n.7 (1955).
316. See SPoERRY 68.
317. See SPOERRY 73.
318. See ORELLi, op. cit. supra note 313, introduction & 39-45.
319. Between 1750 and 1850 less than ten cases of a witness or a party being sworn
are reported. THUDICHUm 66-67.
320. SpomRY 45.
321. SpommRy 46. Zwingli's view that the oath is a command of neighborly love is
based on his adoption of St. Paul's view, Hebrews 6, that the oath puts an end to all
controversy, that is, the notion of the decisive oath, not that of the assertory oath. Ibid.
322. Ibid.
323. Zwingli did not expressly refer to judicial oaths, but in relying on St. Paul, he
impliedly included them. SPOERRY 46-47. Spoerry also cited the "Eydts-Acta" of 1564-
1672, which contain resolutions, opinions and projects for a reform of the entire oath
practice, which was adopted in 1650. Like Zwingli, the Eydts-Acta concerned themselves
solely with oaths of office. See SPOERRY 60-63.
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Swiss legislation limiting the oath was in evidence as early as the sixteenth
century. Section thirty-five of the City Statute of Berne in 1539 provided that
no oath should be taken by parties in matters involving five Shilling Denares
or less. The Statute of 1614, concerning Court Procedure for Berne, pro-
hibited oaths in matters "touching a person's soul, honor, body or life,"
(criminal and religious matters) and permitted use of the oath in other in-
stances only if the litigation involved more than three pounds Pfennig or
was a controversy over land. The Zurich City and Land Law of 1715 pro-
vided that witnesses in civil matters must never be sworn and admitted a party
to oath only .in paternity cases. Even in these cases, the oath was limited to
plaintiffs and defendants of good reputation. Only exceptionally were wit-
nesses to be sworn in criminal cases. Provisions containing far-reaching re-




Apparently, for reasons grounded in their culture and the development of
their legal system, the Chinese have never introduced the oath.
Until the overthrowing of Manchus dynasty and the founding of the Re-
public in 1911, the political philosophy of China was strictly authoritarian.
Government officials were believed to have the function of controlling, not
serving, the people. The magistrate of a "hsien" 26 was addressed by the local
inhabitants as "wu-mou-kuan," literally conveying the idea that he stood in
loco parentis to the people of his district. Under the tradition of filial piety,
district residents owed him absolute obedience. In a proceeding in which the
magistrate performed the functions of both prosecutor and judge, the accused
was hardly in a social or legal position to deviate from the truth. If he did,
he would be disgraced under long established patriarchal tradition and im-
mediately subjected to violent inquisitorial action by the magistrate. There-
fore, an oath was unnecessary. Nevertheless, even under this system, formal-
ities were not entirely lacking. An accused person was required to sign his
name or, in the case of an illiterate, to place the finger print of his right
thumb, at the end of a statement reduced to writing by a clerk designated by
the magistrate.
The absence of the oath in Chinese culture is attributable to the influence
of Confucian teachings. Its basic tenets are that man is by nature good and
must maintain his dignity; government by the impact of ethical standards is
preferable to government by law.327 Honesty and dignity were imbued in the
324. See THumlCEmU 66-67.
325. The following account of Chinese law and its cultural background is an abbre-
viated version of an unpublished paper by Mr. Li Chun, Associate Professor of Law,
Soodow University, Taipei, Taiwan, a Graduate Fellow at Yale Law School, 1958-1959.
The present writer is greatly indebted to Professor Li for his contribution.
326. A "hsien" is a political sub-division in the Chinese administrative system, similar
to a United States county.
327. See TzE SZE, THE DocrmiNE OF "MEAN" ch. I, § 1 (1929).
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people as the primary rules of conduct. Since an oath presumes that man is
fundamentally untruthful, dishonest and undignified, a Chinese imbued with
Confucian teaching would naturally be averse to swearing.
HISTORY OF DOCTRINES OF PERJURY
Oath conceptions are reflected in the character of the sanctions imposed
for breach of an oath, that is, perjury. Thus, the development of the notion
of "perjury" is an integral part of the evolution of the "oath."
Infected by the atavistic features of the oath, the concept of "perjury" has
developed irrationally. The mystical awe surrounding the oath-a carry-over
from times long past-has greatly contributed to the confusion in perjury
legislation. And the varieties of prehistoric and historic oath concepts which,
though inconsistent with each other, manage to coexist even at advanced
stages of legal development, clearly affect the perjury notion.
What is it that is punished under the law of perjury? This question, a
corollary of the question, what is the "oath"? has never been uniformly an-
swered, even within the confines of a single legal system. It is, therefore,
necessary to go back to fundamentals and try to isolate the various conceptions
of the oath, as they are reflected in various notions of perjury.
From the historical presentation, it should be evident that the oath was
not originally incidental to testimony. The oath was a conclusive instrument
of legal decision. Testimony was a supplementary, and later, an alternative,
means of disposition and, in the course of time, it became an alternative means
of proof. Accordingly, perjury and false testimony were separate phenomena,
though neither was originally geared to "untruth" in a modern sense. As a
more advanced concept of "truth" took shape, "false testimony" became a
crime predicated on the assumption that the "untruth" was socially harmful.
In contrast, perjury for long periods of history applied not to an assertory
utterance, the contents of which might conform or fail to conform to reality,
but only to a constitutive act, the oath. The earliest form of oath was the
vow, oriented to loyalty rather than to truth. Its next stage was the oath of
purgation, the exact nature of which has never been defined. It was apparent-
ly an intermediary notion, occupying a place between the vow and an asser-
tion of truth conceived in the ancient sense of combining righteousness with
power. Thus, untruth in the sense of a false presentation of reality was not at
issue in an accusation of perjury. Recognizing the distinction between perjury
and false testimony, enables the historian better to understand the origins of
perjury. But the problem is by no means resolved.
The conceptual separation of perjury and false testimony was not uniformly
observed even in early law. When the oath became the essence of testimony-
as it was particularly in the old Germanic law-the crimes of perjury and
false testimony tended to merge. The characteristic feature of each affected
the other. In some systems, a substantially complete merger has taken place,
although vestiges of separation remain. For example, in France even now
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there is no separate concept of false testimony. "Faux timoignage" of article
361 of the Penal Code is "perjury," inasmuch as the oath is the essence of
testimony. Where perjury finally came to be regarded as an aggravated form
of false testimony, one might expect the original separation similarly to have
been overcome. However, that separation still persists and is, indeed, often
accentuated in contemporary law.
When perjury, as well as false testimony, was encompassed by the general
concept of falsum, perjury was transformed into a crime affecting the rights
of others. Perjury was integrated into the general scheme of crime against
social interests and reliance on the oath became its central rationale.
The impact of a strong centralized state upon litigation gave a new im-
print to the oath and the perjury sanction. The state increasingly, though
imperceptibly, adapted the allegedly "religious" notion of the oath to its own
practical needs. The testimonial oath was introduced into Roman law by im-
perial order under the pretense that it was a Christian institution. Since
the pretense was effective, there was no need to impose secular perjury sanc-
tions. Appearing on the historical scene at a time when the concept of truth
had undergone a fundamental transformation and asserting a public interest
in all litigation, states began to utilize the oath and its incident, the perjury
sanction, to exact man's "truth," to which the state claimed it was entitled.
There emerged the institutional, "governmental" concept of the crime of per-
jury, which asserts as the dominant interest protection of the administration
of justice rather than the avoidance of harm incidental to false testimony or
a misleading oath. The state assumed what had been the status of the Divinity
and of the Church, as the authority to whom "truth"-truth per se-is due,
regardless of the results of falsehood. Under this theory, which partially
equates the state to God, perjury is punishable as blasphemy once was-a
crime ranging next to idolatry-and hence severely and mercilessly. Actually,
the state went further than the Church, for the eccesiastical view of perjury
was far less rigorous and authoritarian than is the modern "governmental"
concept. Conversely, ancient theological ideas have helped to modify the rigid-
ity of this governmental concept of perjury by introducing the idea of the
mitigating or, indeed, immunizing effect of a "state of necessity."
A brief outline of the conceptions of perjury and false testimony in the legal
systems which helped to shape the ideas of modern law will show how the
various conceptions have interacted, but have failed to assume a clear and
final shape.
Biblical Law
The magic of the oath was reflected in the Biblical concept of perjury,
which appeared in the context of other probably magical acts. The breach of
a vow was punishable in the Bible, but to ascertain what type of punishment
was imposed upon it, one of the most obscure Old Testament passages, deal-
ing with atonement for the breach of a vow sworn by the Children of Israel
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to the Gibeonites,328 must be deciphered. The word used in this context to
describe the execution (hoqa) is similarly used only in one other instance3 29
in the Bible, where the crime atoned for was idolatry combined with whore-
dom, and consuming blood. A relationship between these two isolated passages
can be demonstrated if we assume-as is linguistically probable-that the
execution involved in both instances was the "spewing out" of some matter;
the elimination of the curse contained in the blood or in the oath 30
False testimony, as distinguished from the false oath, was governed by the
leA- talionis: the false witness was to suffer, as a penalty, the same injury he
attempted to inflict upon his brother.331 The crime was clearly conceived as
a rational social crime, predicated upon the socially dangerous consequences
of the act.
Roman Law
In Roman law perjury was not punished, since it was believed subject to
direct divine retribution,33 2 unless the act of perjury simultaneously consti-
tuted another crime, such as a crimen laesae maiestatis (crime of injured
majesty), or a stellionatus which was a crimen extraordinariumi, a general
crime comparable to the civil law ddlus.3 33 Throughout the classical period,
as in Biblical law, Roman witnesses were not sworn; thus a witness could
328. 2 Sanmel 21:6, 9, 13.
329. Numbers 25:4.
330. Rashi, 4 THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHr's COMMENTARY Numbers 25:4, at 266
(Ben Isaiah & Sharfman ed. & transl. 1950), suggests that hoqa refers to hanging, and
meets the objection that the crime punished in 2 Samuel 21, idolatry, was normally
punishable by stoning, by conjecturing that all who were stoned were also hanged. Gray, A
Critical and Exegetical Comnentary on Numbers, in INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COM-MEN-
TARY ON THE HOLY SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS 383 (1903), assumes
that hoqa is some kind of capital execution, but that "it is scarcely hanging, for which
the Hebrews used another word [talah]. .. ." W. R. SMITH, LECTURES ON THE RELIGION
OF THE SEITES 398 (1889), suggests the meaning of hoqa to be "cast down." Dillman,
Note to Numbers, cited in DRIvER, NoTEs ON THE HEBpmV TEXT OF THE Booxs OF
SAMUEL. 351 (Zd ed. 1913), conjectures that the word means something more than the
ordinary talah (hanging). He notices that hoqa is used elsewhere in the sense of separa-
tion, dislocation (Genesis 32:26), severing, alienation (Jeremiah 6:8; Ezekiel 23:17, 18).
Therefore, we may assume that hoqa refers to some act preceding the execution. If the
word means "to cause to vomit" or "spew" (this requires a slight emendation [aleph
instead of ayin], then it implies purging of the magic of eating with the blood and of
the oath.
Notice in this context the view, COOK, THE OLD TESTAMENT, A REINTERPRETATION
197 (1936), of sacrificial blood as a means of "unsinning" men.
Numbers 25:4 figures prominantly in Sellin's interpretation of Moses' murder, SELLIN,
MOSE UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG FUR DIE ISRAELITISCH-JUJDISCHE RELIGIONSGESCHICHTE
(1922), on which Freud based his theory of Moses, sein Volk, und die nionotlecistische
Religion, in 16 FREUD, GESAMMELTE WERKE (1950).
331. See Deuter. 19:18, 19.
332. See KuTTNER 11.
333. See MAURACH, DEUTSCHES STRAFREcHT-BEoNDERER TErL 234-45 (1953).
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not commit perjury.334 The party oath was not a means of cognitive proof but
an ordeal-like act, so that no legal recourse was open against a false oath.
Not only was a criminal action (stellionatus) against the perjuring party
barred, but even in a civil action the exceptio iuris iurandi (exception setting
forth the fact that an oath had been taken) could not be challenged by a
replicatio doli (replication that the oath was fraudulent). 33'
By contrast, false testimony was punishable in Rome at an early period.
According to the law of the Twelve Tables, a witness who testified falsely
was thrown from the Mons Tarpeius. 336 The reason for this choice of execu-
tion is obscure. According to one interpretation, being "cast down" was the
Biblical execution for breaching an oath. Even if this be true, no explanation,
other than the similarity of the two acts in modern thought, is available for
the extension of a punishment for perjury to false testimony. In any event,
a death sentence for false testimony in capital crimes appears in the Lex
Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis (concerning assassins and poisoners, first cen-
tury B.,C.).337 False testimony was there treated, like poisoning, as a rational
crime, sanctions for which were oriented to harmful social consequences. 38
Germanic and German-Roman Law until End of the Middle Ages
The leges barbarorum, were the first laws to treat the falsum as intentional
deception of another and perjury as a religious crime.33 9 These laws also
334. But see the authorities cited in KuTrNER 11 n.24, which Kuttner considers un-
persuasive because of the total silence of the Digests regarding the testimonial oath.
335. See KuTrNER 13. Even after introduction of the accused's oath de veritate
dicenda, apparently, the accused could not be punished for perjury. Serpillion, a seven-
teenth century writer, remarked that "there is actually almost as much perjury as there
is oath on this occasion; but the accused cannot be punished for such false swearing."
SERPILLIoN, CODE CRIMINEL 659, cited in Esmixs -HsToRY 379.
In the German "common law," decisively influenced by Roman law, whether a false
oath of purgation was punishable as perjury was the subject of vigorous controversy.
For a list of authorities pro and con see voN LiszT, DIE FALscHE AUSSAGE 133 (1887).
After abolition of torture, the inquisitorial procedure used penalties for lying and for dis-
obedience. SCHMIDT, EINFiDHRUNG IN DIE GESCHIcHTE DER DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTSPFLEGE
299 (1947).
336. See the report of Gellius, cited in KuTTNER 5. MomsMEN, RomIscHES STRAF-
RECHT 668 n.1 (1899), interprets this passage as applicable to perjury and evincing the
strong protection accorded to the sacredness of the oath. But the Twelve Tables speak
expressly of "falsnl testimonium" rather than of the breach of an oath. As stated by 1
STRACHAN-DAvDSON, PROBLEMS OF ROMAN CRIMINAL LAw 48 (1912):
The Roman people could incur the wrath of Heaven only by the breach of an oath
taken by the representative of the people, the Fetial. Perjury by a private man is
a matter which from first to last is left to the vengeance of the gods, and the law
never threatens secular penalties against the offender.
337. KUTr.NER 6; Mo SEN, op. cit. supra note 336, at 615, 628. The punishment of
the false witness who caused the execution of another was one of the rare cases in Roman
law where the penalty of death followed condemnation in a private suit. STRACHAN-DAVID-
SON, op. cit. sapra note 336, at 41,
338. See text at note 331 supra.
339. See KuTER 14-17.
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introduced the penalty of loss of the hand with which the false oath was
taken. 340 Still, however, uniformity among these laws regarding the entire area
of false testimony and perjury was noticeably lacking. Some laws stressed the
former, others the latter, a disjunction that is in fact typical of the entire
German criminal law throughout the Middle Ages. In medieval sources, evi-
dences of penalties for false testimony and perjury are rare. The Sachsen-
spiegel, the most important medieval German law book, does not mention any,
which may only indicate that its authors regarded these offenses as exclusive-
ly within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Among the other law sources, some speak
only of false testimony, others only of perjury. Among the discussions of per-
jury, some stress the religious element of the crime, while others classify it
together with crimes of falsification.
3 41
Canon Law
Significantly, even the canon law, which might be expected to have intro-
duced a firm religious orientation toward perjury, accentuated the duality of
approach by distinguishing the crime of perjury from the sin of perjury and
predicating only the crime upon an intention to deceive. According to this
conception, the crime of perjury consists in abusing another person's reliance
on the sacredness of the oath, not in wrongfully invoking God's name.
342
The canon law also preserved the Roman distinction of perjury and false
testimony.
3 4 3
Modern Development in Civil Law Countries
Italian scholars of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries were the
first to elaborate false testimony as a subspecies of a general substantive con-
cept of the falsum, which they understood as a conscious untruth that would
probably damage another. As in the canon law, the injury need not have
occurred, but it must have been at least possible. Since the crime of false
testimony was predicated upon potential damage, the relevance of the testi-
mony was of the essence. In the Italian theory, the falsum element seems
also to have penetrated the crime of perjury, still distinguished from false
testimony. As a result, perjury too was not punishable if it did not and was
not apt to harm anyone.
3 44
The Constitutio Crimninalis Carolina345 classified perjury in context with
blasphemy and magic. At the same time, however, it dealt with false testimony
340. Ibid.
341. Kuttner refuted von Liszt's view of perjury as a religious crime until the modern
era and showed that the historical notion of perjury was by no means uniform. Kurr-
NER 16.
342. Id. at 17-20.
343. See id. at 19.
344. See id. at 20-24.
345. Printed in DiE PEINLICHE GERICHTSORDNUNG KAISER KAnS V, at 1 (Kohler
& Scheel ed. 1900).
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against an accused in a criminal case both in the article devoted to perjury 8 46
and in a separate article,347 and in both instances imposed the penalty of
talion. Thus, the Carolina treated false testimony as a specific instance of per-
jury and as a separate crime.348 Whether the classification of perjury between
blasphemy and magic, and the treatment of false testimony as a species of
perjury, indicate that the Carolina regarded perjury as a purely religious
crime, is uncertain.349 According to Carpzov,35 0 perjury by a party was clear-
ly a religious crime-a crinien laesae maiestatis divinae-an adaptation to
God of the protection accorded Roman emperors in the crimen laesae inaies-
tatis. Significantly, it was not the Church, but the Germans that elaborated
this purely religious concept of perjury. On the other hand, Carpzov con-
sidered actual damage an essential element of the crime of false testimony;
in the case of a mere possibility of damage only a conviction for criminal at-
tempt was available.35 1
In eighteenth-century Germany, party perjury and false testimony coalesced.
Both were classified as a crinen falsi, a labeling that had been suggested long
before in the Italian doctrine. Yet the falsum itself has remained a vague and
indefinite crime. Thus, this classification of perjury did not actually introduce
a final clarification of its meaning.
Nor did the great theorists of German criminal science, Feuerbach, Mitter-
maier and von Liszt, succeed in clarifying the concept of perjury. Much in
their theories is pure verbiage. During the era of the Enlightenment, when
the religious interpretation of perjury was on the wane, two opposing views
emerged: one, represented particularly by Feuerbach, regarded both perjury
and false testimony as special instances of fraud; the other, advanced by Mit-
termaier, characterized perjury as a falsification comparable to counterfeiting,
violating the publica fides, that is, public reliance on the formality of the oath
as a guarantee of genuineness. 33 2 Actually, the latter view is but a modified
version of the canon law conception of perjury as an abuse of other persons'
reliance upon the sanctity of the oath. As shown by von Liszt,353 however,
"publica fides," a term derived from Cicero's oratory, was elaborated by Ger-
man and Italian doctrine into a comprehensive system, in which the sacred-
ness of the oath figured as the cornerstone of the administration of justice
and of the total state organization. 354 Von Liszt criticized this doctrine, point-
ing out that "the oath once was the 'foundation pillar of the entire legal life;'
346. Art. 107.
347. Art. 68.
348. See MAURACH, op. cit. supra note 333, at 502.
349. See KuTmER 24-30.
350. Carpzov, born 1595, died 1666, is regarded as the founder of German legal
science. See ScHmiDT, op. cit. supra note 335, at 129-36.
351. See KuJTrxER 30-31.
352. See id. at 33-34.
353. voN LISZT, op. cit. supra note 335, at 10.
354. Id. at 14.
1386 [Vol. 68:1329
THE OATH
but today it is a rudimentary creature, an empty form, long since forsaken
by the idea which gave it life, a plant grown stiff in the frost of religious in-
difference." Von Liszt himself suggested that, sworn or unsworn, false testi-
mony is a crime against public administration and endangers the security of
judicial decision. The criminal character of the acts consisted in the abstract
jeopardy of judicial security; it was unnecessary that they actually or even
potentially influence a concrete decision.3 5
Out of such variety of historical and dogmatic roots there grew a wide
divergence of approaches to perjury and false testimony in the legislation of
civil law countries. Among these, the most moderate traditional approach is
that represented by French law, conceiving of perjury as a crimen falsi, where-
as the newest extreme "government oriented" position is reflected in con-
temporary German law.356
Common Law Countries
"Very ancient law seems to be not quite certain whether it ought to punish
perjury at all. Will it not be interfering with the business of the gods ?"357
This observation seems equally applicable to English as to continental systems.
Originally, of course, perjury punished itself. Later it was punished by a
divinity. When the crime was legally sanctioned, it was conceived to be a
crime of blasphemy, ranging right after idolatry, and hence a capital crime.
Gradually, however, the sanctions imposed became milder. Thus, Blackstone
remarked that the penalty was "anciently death; afterwards banishment, or
cutting out the tongue; then forfeiture of goods; and now it is fine and im-
prisonment and never more to be capable of giving testimony."3 As in the
civil law, this development seems traceable to changing conceptions of the
oath. The oaths of parties and witnesses were originally "oaths asserting not
the existence of particular facts, but the goodness of the swearer's cause."3 59
The laws of King Edward the Elder speak of "perjurers" where "an oath
failed to them," that is when they failed to produce the required number of
compurgators or when one of the compurgators refused to join in the oath.
For such "perjurers" it was provided merely that "they afterwards should
not be oath-worthy but ordeal-worthy. '3 60 Temporal punishment was first
imposed upon the offense by King Henry VIII's statute in 1540, which
punished some instances of subornation of perjury by a fine, but left perjury
itself unpunished. In Devonport v. Sympson, decided in 1596, it was said that
"there was not any punishment for any false oath of any witness at the com-
355. Id. at 20, 21.
356. On the present state of the law see the second part of this Article.
357. 2 PoLLocy, & MAITLAND, THE HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 541 (Cambridge 2d
ed. 1952).
358. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138, citing 3 COKE, INSTITUTES *240.
359. See 3 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 240 (1883).
360. 3 id. at 241. "[F]or several centuries no trace is to be found of the punishment
of witnesses for perjury." 3 id. at 242.
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mon law."36' This is explained by the statement that "the law intends the
oath of every man to be true. °3 6 2 Apparently "true" was used to mean "final."
The statement thus suggests that punishment of perjury would conflict with
the finality of judgment. This legal presumption is reminiscent of the oath
that "tries" the case, the ancient oath which was the judgment and not mere-
ly a basis of judgment. Later rationalizations for granting immunity from
perjury sanctions to witnesses who were called to testify in royal indictments
and in cases of felonies or murder were rather utilitarian: to render such
evidence examinable for perjury would "deter men from giving evidence for
the king" and "bring public scandal upon the justice of the kingdom."3 63 The
only persons subject to perjury punishment by lay courts were jurors. But in
most cases, even they "stood in no terror of a law against perjury," for "if
both parties to the litigation had voluntarily 'put themselves' upon a jury,
neither of them could complain of the verdict." In other instances, punishment
was imposed "only in a casual, incidental fashion in the course of attaints
which were regarded mainly as a means of reversing untrue verdicts. 3 64
When witnesses were given the function of testifying to facts, there de-
veloped a social interest in substantial, and not merely symbolical, punishment
of perjury.3 65 This, of course, changed the character of the crime itself.3 66 In
time perjury developed into a crimen falsi,367 involving "the element of false-
hood" and including "everything which has a tendency to injuriously affect
the administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud." As
such, perjury was classified together with "forgery . . .suppression of testi-
mony by bribery or conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness, barratry,
the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing, to the prejudice of another
man's right."3 6'  Even as a crimnen falsi, perjury was limited to interference
with the administration of justice in judicial proceedings and the materiality
of the false statement was an essential requirement.
Whether perjury has continued to bear the character of a crimen falsi may
be doubted, for, as stated by one writer: "the gist of the offense is the abuse
of public justice, and not the injury to an individual."36 9 It does not matter
whether the false oath was believed or disbelieved, or whether it caused any
injury to the person against whom it was given.3 7 0 At the same time, the
crime of perjury remained applicable only to judicial proceedings. As sworn
361. 3 id. at 245.
362. Ibid.
363. HunsoN's TR1EAxsE 71-82, cited in 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. szora note 359, at 247.
364. 2 PoLLocK & MAITLAND, op. cit. smtpra note 357, at 541-42.
365. Perjury by a witness was declared punishable in Rowland "ap Eliza," Mich. 10
Jas. (1613), cited in 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 359, at 248.
366. 3 id. at 240.
367. See PERKINS, CRrUMINAL LAw 382 (1957).
368. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 334 Pa. 321, 323, 5 A.2d 804, 805 (1939) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 167 Atl. 645 (1933)).
369. 1 RussEL, CimE 326 (11th ed. 1.958).
370. See 1 id. at 326 nA4 (citing authorities).
1388 [Vol. 68:1329
statements came to be required in many matters other than judicial proceed-
ings, the common law provided a separate penalty for wilful and corrupt false
swearing in these other contexts.3 7 1 Perjury and false swearing have remained
distinct offenses, the latter at times being held to be a lesser offense included
in the former and at other times not to be so included.3 7 2 At common law,
however, perjury itself was only a misdemeanor. It was made a felony in
most jurisdictions by statute. This increase in the gravity of the crime marks
the beginning of the present development of the law of perjury.
CONCLUSION
In the history of culture, institutions of ancient origin are often adapted
to newly emerging situations, either because their ancient rationale has been
of permanent value or because of a change in their nature or justification.
The oath has survived unsupported by either reason. Originally a primitive
conditional self-curse, the oath has undergone only superficial renovations.
In the pre-animistic stage, the oath was a meaningful expression of man's
belief in his own magic powers; within the framework of such belief, it was
a rational means of social control. So long as social rather than cognitive
elements dominated procedure, the procedural act of a dispositive self-curse
was well suited to the ends of litigation. As man ceased to believe in his ability
to dominate the course of events through supernatural media, the oath as a
self-curse became an anachronism. As litigation became oriented to a cognitive
concept of truth, the oath, even where it ceased to be conclusive and developed
into a probative device subject to judicial evaluation, became obsolete. For
notwithstanding its change of function, the oath has never quite lost its primi-
tive roots in the decisive magic rite.
If, as von Liszt thought, our law is deeply entrenched in atavism, or if,
as Freud believed, we preserve in our unconscious archaic elements of our
culture, there are still present in our motivation to veracity under oath-the
oath to God-ancient primitive roots of Jacob's oath upon "pahad" of his
father. That an anxiety of such nature is an effective means of inducing
veracity is, at best, uncertain. But most certainly such anxiety is apt to reduce
the spontaneity of testimony and the capacity to reconstruct faithfully the
objective reality of past events. Administration of an oath is an appeal to the
compulsive unconscious. Thus, in a modern sense it remains a tortura spirit-
ualis, a "civil blackmail," for in order to extract testimony it violates the
privacy of man's personality and disturbs his striving toward rationality.
371. See PFRKINS, op. cit. supra note 367, at 382.
372. In Commonwealth v. Scowden, 92 Ky. 120, 122, 17 S.W. 205 (1891), the court
said:
The offense of false swearing is a statutory one, and distinct from that of perjury,
which existed at common law. The two have no connection. The former is not
mentioned by the common law writers, and the elements of the two are different.
The charge of perjury does not embrace that of false swearing.
But see The Queen v. Hodgkiss, L.R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 212 (1869).
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Plainly, as a self-curse, the oath is inconsistent with our contemporary notions
of the dignity of the man who takes it and of the state that administers it.
The historical analysis of the evolution of the oath reveals a continuity in
conceptions of the oath throughout the ages. Likewise, criticism of the insti-
tution has obtained in all cultures and in all ages which accepted it. At the
present time, when modern psychology has directed our attention to irrational
elements in our mental processes, there is new ground for reevaluation of
this atavistic survival in our law.
Criticism of the oath in civil law countries has, in recent decades, contrib-
uted to important reforms. Against the background of history of the oath, the
advances made in some contemporary legislation, as contrasted with survivals
of past ages preserved in other modem laws, may realistically be evaluated.
This is the purpose of the second part of this Article.
